Aspects of environmental and safety analysis of fusion reactors by Kazimi, Mujid S. et al.
ENOINEERING 'MASSACHUSETTS INS
OF TECHNOLOGY
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
READING ROOM -M.I.T.
ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY
ANALYSIS OF FUSION REACTORS
by
M. S. Kazimi, Editor
D. A. Dube, R. W. Green, L. M. Lidsky,
N. C. Rasmussen, R. W. Sawdye and J. A. Sefci
TRIMTi
''7
.jq
'4
j
3
-Irk.
MITNE-212
NUCLEAR ENGINEERINU
READING ROOM - M.I.I
DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
October 1977
ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY
ANALYSIS OF FUSION REACTORS
by
M. S. Kazimi, Editor
D. A. Dube, R. W. Green, L. M. Lidsky,
N. C. Rasmussen, R. W. Sawdye and J. A. Sefcik
Progress Report for the Period
October 1, 1976 to September 30, 1977
Contract EY-76-S-02-2431
U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration
-ii-
ABSTRACT
This report summarizes the progress made between October
1976 and September 1977 in studies of some environmental and
safety considerations in fusion reactor plants. A methodology
to assess the admissible occurrence rate of major accidental
releases is outlined. The pathways for tritium releases are
defined. Preliminary assessment of the important factors in
evaluation of the reactor containment building response to
Li-Air fire is presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1.1 Introduction
The effort to define the potential for electric power
production from nuclear fusion has significantly intensified
within the last few years. The choice among the energy
resource options is influenced by, among other factors,
the environmental impact of the technology associated with
each option. Thus, an early determination of the potential
advantages and hazards of each of the long-term energy options,
such as nuclear fusion, is an integral part of the effort to
define the desirability of each option in a risk-benefit
context.
Beyond this obvious goal of comparison among alternative
future energy sources, early attention to the environmental
and safety considerations will tend to minimize the environ-
mental hazards by appropriately influencing the fusion reactor
designs as well as research and development plans. Thus, it
is not surprising to find several recent publications on
environmental and safety considerations in fusion power plant
designs.1 -5
Associated with any power system containing radioactivity
there exists a potential hazard or risk resulting from
possible accidental releases. A study of the risks associated
with commercial fission power reactors in the United States
6was detailed in the Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH-1400)
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From a radiological risk perspective, fusion reactor plants
appear to have inherently two potential advantages over the
fission reactors:
1) The radioactivity associated with the fuel cycle
itself is less hazardous than that of the fission
reactor fuel cycle. The radioactivity induced in
the structures depends greatly on the materials
employed. Hence, there is a large degree of lati-
tude in minimizing the total radioactivity in the
fusion reactors of the future.
2) The radioactivity of the structures so far consid-
ered in fusion reactor design is of a half-life
that is considerably shorter than that of the fission
reactors, which mitigates the problems of waste
disposal.
The broad objectives of the present study, which was
initiated in October of 1976, are:
1) To develop a methodology for assessment of radio-
logical hazards from fusion reactor power plants.
2) To develop design criteria to ensure adequately
low levels of radiological hazards of fusion power
plants.
It is obvious that such broad objectives have to be pursued
within the bounds of available reactor plant design data.
While several conceptual designs for fusion power plants
exist, more emphasis is currently placed on the Tokamak
-3-
concepts. Thus, the UWMAK-III design has been selected as
a reference reactor plant for this initial study. The
UWMAK-III design has been described in sufficient detail to
allow a reasonable level of quantitative assessment of the
radioactivity inventory and distribution, and, hence, radio-
activity hazard analysis. However, in many respects, there
is sufficient similarity in safety and environmental concern
among the various fusion reactor designs to render the conclu-
sions from the present study relevant to other concepts. It
should be noted that the radioactivity inventories used in the
present study were among the highest possible in Tokamak
reactors since no credit was taken for isotopic tailoring to
minimize radioactivity. 8
Radiological hazards may be classified as associated with
routine releases from the reactor plant or with accidental
releases. The former case results in a "definite" environ-
mental impact while the later results in a "potential" impact.
The probability of the accidental impact is commonly defined
in "safety analyses" of a reactor plant. Assessment of the
realistic radiological hazards of both routine and accidental
releases involves combining the probability and the consequence
of the releases. In Figure 1.1, the steps undertaken in such
an assessment are defined. Such an assessment was employed
in the "Reactor Safety Study"6 pertaining to accidental
releases from commercial nuclear fission power plants.
Figure 1.1
FUSION REACTOR CONCEPT
A Proposed Methodology of S&EI Assessment
Task Safety Environmental Impact
Assess Radioactivity Inventory
1. Tritium
2. Structural
3. Corrosion products
Define Conditions of Radio- Perform Mechanistic Evaluation Define Rate of Release Under
activity Release to Contain- of Faulty Conditions e.g.: Normal Operating Conditions
ment 1. Loss of Blanket Coolant 1. Tritium Diffusion
2. Loss of Diverter Coolant 2. Radioactivity Streaming
3. Loss of Magnet Coolant 3. First Wall Replacement
4. Containment events 4. Blanket Replacement
a. lithium spill
b. helium pipe rupture
Probability = 1.0
Establish Probability of
Release of x ci/hr in
Each Event
Define Radioactivity
Dispersion in Atmosphere
Define Consequences of
Release of x mrem/hr
I~
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Two major sources of radioactivity hazards are easily
identified: (1) the tritium inventory and (2) the activation
products in the structures. Tritium release to the atmosphere
is the major radioactivity source during normal operation.
However, under severe accident conditions where the structural
activation products may be released to the atmosphere, the
contribution of tritium to the total biological hazard poten-
tial may not be dominant.
For UWMAK-III design, the potential radioactivity release
associated with vaporization of the TZM first wall is illustra-
ted in Figure 1.2. It is clear that the total radioactivity
of the first wall, which is roughly 25% of the induce4 radio-
activity in the structures, is twice as large as radioactivity
of the tritium inventory. More significantly, tritium, a
beta particle emitter, can be permitted at a higher concentra-
tion in air than the structural nuclides. As shown in Table
1.1, the inventories of several isotopes will require larger
volumes of air to become diluted to the maximum permissible
concentration (MPC) than does tritium. Compared with the
energy requirement to vaporize the structural material, only
two sources of energy within the reactor plant appear to be
signigicant, as illustrated in Figure 1.3:
a) Lithium-Air or Lithium-Concrete reactions
b) The energy stored in the toroidal magnetic field.
Thus, considerable attention should be given to the mechanisms
by which the available energy can be deposited in the first
wall, which has the highest specific (per unit volume)
structural radioactivity.
-6-
Figure 1.2 First Wall Activity Inventory
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TABLE 1.1
Radiological Hazard Potential for Radioisotopes
of UWMAK-III (TZM First Wall)
PRINCIPAL
FIRST WALL
ISOTOPE
TOTAL KM of
TO DILUTE
TO MPC
8.7 x 107
7.0 x 10 7
6.2 x 10 7
4.0 x 10
3.9 x 10 7
2. 2 x 10 7
1.72 x 106
1.5 x 106
1.5 x 106
3.3 x 106
2.1 x 106
5.7 x 10 5
5.7 x 10 5
2.4 x 106
5.7 x 10 5
8.7 x 106
7.9 x 106
6.2 x 106
2.8 x 108
3.9 x 106
2. 2 x 106
3.43 x 108
1.5 x 105
1.5 x 105
9.9 x 106
2.1 x 105
5.7 x 104
27.7 x 107
2.4 x 105
5.7 x 104
TOTAL = 596.7 x 10 6Ci
(For Total First Wall Inventory)
AIR
TOTAL
CURIES
Nb 92m
Zr 89
Nb 95m
Mo 99
Nb 96
Nb 9 1 m
T
Tc 101
Mo 101
Nb 95
Zr 95
Mo 93
Tc 99m'
Mo 91
Y 88
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Figure 1. 3
Energy Requirement for
Vaporization of First Wall
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In Chapter II, several considerations in assessment
of the hazards from the induced radioactivity and tritium
are presented. A proposed methodology to assess the ad-
missible occurrence rate of major releases is outlined. The
pathways for tritium releases are defined.
In Chapter III, preliminary assessment of the important
factors in evaluation of reactor containment building response
to Li-air fire is presented. Also, the potential for gener-
ating sufficiently high temperatures during the fire to
vaporize the structural material is evaluated from basic
thermodynamic considerations.
Many aspects of the work reported here are under ongoing
investigation, and it is hoped that some of the uncertainties
may be reduced in the near future.
-10-
1.2 Summary
The following is a summary of the major results and
conclusions of this preliminary study.
1) A methodology has been proposed to determine
admissible radioactivity release probabilities,
from comparisons of consequences of radioactivity
releases to established acceptable levels or risk.
One example of this technique is the use of the
results of the Reactor Safety Study, representing
an admissible risk for current commercial nuclear
power plants. The release probability constraints
thus determined may be used to set major component
reliability requirements for a Tokamak reactor
design.
2) To illustrate the proposed methodology, pre-
liminary calculations have been performed for re-
leases of stainless steel activation products. The
admissible release probability is dependent on the
accident release magnitudes. Therefore, a range of
possible values for this parameter must be determined
for each structural material. The consequences of
activation product releases are also sensitive to
the site population characteristics.
3) For a release to occur, both disruption of
structural material and its transport from the
reactor are required. A study of the melting rates
of stainless steel and TZM for sudden energy dumps
-11-
shows that the steel, with a lower BHP value, melts
slower for a heat flux if no significant material
ablation takes place. If material ablation is signi-
ficant, the steel is then found to have a higher
melting rate than the molybdenum alloy.
4) Potential pathways for different release modes
of tritium have been defined.
5) Elemental tritium conversion rates to the oxide
form is such that the order of the reaction, the rate
of the reaction, and the dominant conversion mechanism
are not clearly established. An attempt to analyze
actual tritium releases with the presently accepted
conversion rates have been unsuccessful.
6) During lithium fires, a substantial amount of
the tritium released may be converted to condensible
lithium compounds. The principal products appear
to be LiH, LiOH, H 20, and H 2. The amount of these
products formed is highly specific to the lithium-air
tritium-air molar ratios.
7) Thermodynamic considerations indicate that in
case of a Li-0 2 -N 2 fire, the maximum flame temperature
will be 2500*K or less, depending on the molar ratios
of the interacting materials. For oxygen-depleted
atmosphere, the maximum temperature will be 13154K
or less. The Li-02 reaction is dominant when the
volumetric percentage of 02 in the 0 2-N 2 mixture is
greater than about 1%.
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8) The energy released in lithium-oxygen fires
may lead to a significant overpressure in contain-
ments of proposed plant designs. However, the degree
of overpressurization will depend on various para-
meters, notably on the oxygen concentration, heat
transfer rates from the interaction zone to the gases
and containment wall and floor. Several design
options to mitigate the consequences of a lithium
spill are being analyzed and will be reported on in
the near future.
-13-
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II. RADIOACTIVITY HAZARDS AND ADMISSIBLE RISKS
2.1 Introduction
Most of the radioactivity in Tokamak reactors with a
deuterium-tritium fuel cycle is in two forms: the activated
structural materials exposed to radiation from the plasma
and the tritium used as a fuel for the fusion reaction and
bred in the reactor blanket. Serious accidents resulting
in the disruption of the reactor first wall or blanket
structural materials are required to release any induced
radioactivity. However, because of its mobility, tritium
poses a potential hazard due to normal operational releases
as well as releases resulting from accidents. The total
amount of activity'in a fusion reactor system may be.on the
order of 109 Ci., 2 which is comparable to the total inventory
at a commercial light water fission reactor plant.
The risk assessment report for commercial nuclear power
plants (WASH-1400)1 was based on analyses of the probability
of accidents that may lead to radioactive releases to the
atmosphere. These releases were then used in a consequence
model, the Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences
(CRAC) computer code, to evaluate the probability of exceed-
ing consequences of a given magnitude as a result of radio-
active releases. A similar technique can be utilized to
investigate the potential hazard of the radioactivity in
Tokamak fusion reactor plants. The sources of radioactivity
-15-
must be identified and the activity releasing accidents must
be described. Some type of consequence model can then be
employed to translate the release accidents into risk curves
or consequence magnitude ranges.
The concept of an acceptable or admissible risk for
electricity generation utilitzing nuclear power may be contro-
versial, but can be useful in determining system reliability
requirements. If the fusion reactor accident consequences
are compared to a risk curve representing an admissible risk
to the public (the risk may be defined in terms of probability
of adverse health effects) an admissible failure rate or
frequency of occurrence for release accidents can be derived.
Thus, if an admissible or tolerable level of risk is assumed
or established for nuclear power plants, then the allowable
rate of release or probability for certain accidents can be
determined and may be used to set reliability requirements
for major system components of a fusion power plant.
The goal of this work is to establish a methodology
to determine probable consequences of radioactivity releases
from fusion reactors under accident as well as routine
operational conditions and to utilize the consequence spectrum
to assess the reliability constraints for major Tokamak
system components.
-16-
2.2 Induced Radioactivity
During the operation of a fusion reactor, there will
inevitably develop an inventory of induced radioactivity, or
activation products, in the first wall and blanket structures.
The amount and assortment of radioisotopes will depend on
the nature of the particle fluxes, the type of structural
materials and, to some extent, the duration of exposure to
these particles. The designers of fusion reactor systems
should attempt to minimize the potential hazards presented
by this induced activity by developing reliable designs with
safety features and by proper selection of structural mater-
ials. Using the conceptual designs which are available
for Tokamak type reactors, the radioactivity inventories
can be identified and possible accidents can be examined to
determine the amounts of radioactivity that may be released
to the atmosphere. The characteristics of the releases must
'e described before a consequence model can be used to calcu-
late the risks to the public associated with these
reactors. Much work still needs to be done in this area of
accident analysis before useful and realistic consequence
results can be developed, however, some preliminary results
and an example of the use of the methodology are presented
in this report.
By examining the potential hazards of activation product
releases and comparing them with an acceptable level of
radioactivity-induced risks, for example with the hazards
-17-
presented by commercial fission power plants, a system
reliability requirement can be established in the form
of a maximum tolerable activation product release rate.
This requirement would attempt to prevent induced radio-
activity in fusion plants from posing a greater risk
to the public than conventional nuclear systems. Also,
a comparison of the reliability requirements determined
for activation product and tritium releases should re-
flect the relative hazards that the two forms of radio-
activity represent in the risk assessment of fusion
reactor systems.
2.2.1 Radioisotope Inventory
The first concern in assessing the potential radio-
activity hazard is to determine the inventory and distri-
bution of activity in the reactor system. Two reasonably
well defined systems, UWMAK-I and UWMAK-III,4 will be
used to exemplify the Tokamak-type fusion power reactor
system. Studies have been made to determine the activa-
tion products which will be induced during the operation
of these reactors. The two systems employ different
blanket structural materials (316SS in UWMAK-I; TZM in
UWMAK-III). Neither material was assumed to be tailored
to minimize radioactivity. If such tailoring were to be
used,16 the total radioactivity would be substantially
below that reported in References 3 and 4.
-.Omb- - Adak
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' A calculational scheme has been developed at the
University of Wisconsin to determine the blanket activa-
tion product inventories. 5 The model computes the
activity per kilowatt for each radioisotope, which can then
be divided by their maximum permissible concentration in
air (MPC) to obtain a quantity known as the biological
hazard potential (BHP). The MPC values are determined by
the best available data on the biological effects of each
radioisotope. When this biological data is lacking, a
conservative, or low MPC value is used, resulting in a
high BHP value for the particular isotope.
Using the BHP values from Reference (5), a list of
significant isotopes was compiled for each structural
material, excluding all isotopes with half lives less than
25.0 minutes and all those contributing less than approxi-
mately 1% of the total BHP of the remaining group. The
half life criterion was used in the Reactor Safety Study
(WASH-1400)1 to simplify the consequence calculations by
greatly reducing the number of radioisotopes that had to be
considered. This is based on the assumption that these
isotopes would contribute little hazard in an accident
situation due to the delay between shutdown and the time
it would take for radioactivity to reach the nearby popu-
lation. The change in the total radioactivity between
shutdown and 30 minutes is relatively small for the
inventories studied here. The significant
-19-
isotopes are listed in Table 2.1. The activities, BHP
values and the isotopes themselves are all subject to
change as more information on biological effects of var-
ious radioisotopes is developed and the computational
model is refined.
The activation products are concentrated in the
blanket regions of the Tokamak reactor with a large
fraction of the hazard potential in the first wall.
Detailed descriptions of isotope distributions in the
blanket regions are not available at present, however,
they will only be necessary or useful when detailed
accidental release mechanisms and sequences are defined.
2.2.2. Radioisotope Releases
Most of the attention given to induced radioactivity
in fusion reactors has focused on the problems of waste
disposal and reactor maintenance, and relatively little
has been done to investigate its release into the atmosphere.
The release of activation products requires the disruption
of the first wall or blanket, escape of radioactivity from
the reactor into the primary containment, and finally, a
breach of containment structures. The first wall and blanket
structures are part of a vacuum vessel which is surrounded
by large magnet coils, piping and structural members. This
assembly is encased in shielding and is completely enclosed
by a primary containment.
-
-20-
TABLE 2.1
Activity and Biological Hazard Potential Values for the
Dominant Radioisotopes at Shutdown after Two Years Operation
Radioisotopes Structural Materials
316SS TZM
activity BHP activity BHP
3 3
(Ci/kWth) (km air/kWth) (Ci/kWth)i (km air/kWth)
Mn-54 75.6 75.6
Mn-56 388. 19.4
Fe-55 258. 8.6
Co-57 26.0 26.0
Co-58 131. 65.5
Co-60 6.21 20.7
Ni-57 4.5 4.5
Zr-89 8.97 89.7
Zr-95 2.2 2.2
Nb-95 6.9 2.3
Nb-96 4.59 45.9
Mo-99 28.7 4.1 1204. 172.
Tc-99m 1450. 2.9
-21-
With an inert atmosphere and steel liners on exposed
concrete surfaces, to prevent or mitigate the exothermic
liquid metal reactions with air and concrete, the possible
energy releases for a fusion reactor system appear to be
smaller than for a fission system.
The possible energy sources for the disruption of the
structures are the magnet system (including the liquid
helium coolant), the plasma, the liquid metal coolants,
and the after heat or decay heat in the first wall and
blanket after shutdown. The plasma, with a total energy on
the order of 109 J, could melt or vaporize part of the
first wall if a quench was sufficiently localized.4 However,
this event itself is not likely to result in a breach of
the reactor structures. The much larger stored energies
associated with the toroidal magnetic field, which is on
the order of 101 J, 4 could result in disruption of part
of the structures (see Figure 1.3) if there is a mech-
anism by which a sufficiently localized energy dump
can occur. The helium coolant of the magnet system could
potentially cause structural damage due to thermal inter-
actions and overpressurization following its vaporization.
Large amounts of heat energy could be generated by liquid
metal interactions with air and concrete resulting in
potential structural damage and volatilization of activation
products. However, as discussed in Chapter III, lithium-air
peak flame -'Teperature is approximately 2500 0 K, which
-22-
would melt blanket materials like stainless steel, but not
TZM. Also, it has been suggested that highly reactive
chemical species such as oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen
could be released during liquid metal fires and may lead
to the rapid ablation of the first wall materials. 2
Much of the future work concerning the induced radio-
activity will be directed towards determining how energy
may be deposited in activated structures, the extent of
possible material disruption and the amount and form of
radioactivity which may be released from the reactor
and the containment structure. This information is crucial
for any attempt at assessing the possible hazards of
induced radioactivity in a Tokamak fusion reactor.
2.2.3. Consequence Calculations and System Reliability
Requirements
Preliminary studies have been performed to construct
event trees for accident sequences,2 but due to the conceptual
nature of the reference designs, determination of release
probabilities is practically impossible. However, using a
-23-
maximum permissible risk criterion, calculations of various
release consequences can establish a maximum tolerable failure
rate, which may in turn be used to set reliability require-
ments for major reactor system components. This approach
avoids the necessity for detailed design definitions, which
are not presently available and are not likely to be developed
in the near future.
The calculations of release consequences requires the
determination of the radioisotopes involved, the fraction
of the inventory released to the atmosphere, the conditions
which describe the radioactive plume, and specification of
the weather conditions and population distrubution around
the reactor site. In the present study, the computer code
developed for the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), the CRAC
code, is being modified to handle releases of the activation
products. The output of the consequence code, which is in
the form of consequence probability distribution functions,
can be used to determine the required limitations on failure
rates. A description of the CRAC code and the methodology
for determining the reliability requirements, along with a
preliminary example of this technique, will be presented
in the rest of this section of the report.
2.2.3.a Consequence Model1
The "Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences"
(CRAC) code was developed, as part of the Reactor Safety
Study, to perform the computations to determine consequence
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magnitudes and their probabilities for potential releases of
radioactive materials following commercial nuclear fission
power plant accidents. A schematic outline of the model is
shown in Figure 2.1. The starting point for the calculation is
the magnitude of radioactivity released to the atmosphere. For
the commercial nuclear plants, the spectrum of releases were
discretized into nine Pressurized Water Reactor and five Boiling
Water Reactor categories, each with an associated probability of
occurrence and release magnitude. (As applied in the present
study, a certain fraction of the radioactivity inventory was
assumed to be released, without assigning any probability for
the release.) A meteorological model computes the dispersion
and deposition of radioactive materials as a function of time
after the accident and distance from the reactor. This model
incorporates factors accounting for the decay of the radio-
activity and includes the effects of thermal stability, wind
speed and precipitation in a Gaussian dispersion model. The
temporal variations of these weather parameters are obtained
by using samples from a year's weather data from reactor sites.
Variations of the mixing layer are included. The effects of
the plume lifting off the ground due to the release of sensible
heat is also included, and the plume is not allowed to pene-
trate the mixing layer.
Once the concentration of the radioactivity in the air and
on the ground is determined, the model calculates the possible
doses from various modes of exposure. These include external
irradiation from the cloud and radioisotopes on the ground,
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Figure 2.1
Schematic Outline of Consequence model
(from the Reactor Safety Study)
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and internal irradiation from inhaled radioisotopes and
ingestion of contaminated crops, water and milk. The
distribution of people about the reactor site is used along
with an evacuation model to obtain a set of doses for the
affected population. These doses are transformed to actual
health effects, such as early (within a year) fatalities,
early illnesses, cancer deaths and genetic effects. The
health effects are used as the measure of the accident
consequences.
The final results, which include property damage in
addition to health effects, are formed by combining the conse-
quence probability distribution functions for the spectrum
of release conditions at the various reactor sites using the
spectrum of weather conditions. Thus, the assessment of a
large number of individual reactor accidents is then expressed
as a set of complementary cumulative distribution functions
for each of the potential consequences.
2.2.3.b Example to Illustrate Methodology
A preliminary determination of the consequences of
stainless steel activation product releases has been performed.
Since specific values for the required parameters, which
describe the possible releases, have yet to be defined for
accidents in a Tokamak system, values were chosen which were
similar to those used for fission reactor accidents in WASH-
1400. The values were varied to determine the sensitivity
of the consequences to each parameter. Table 2.2 summarizes
the cases that were investigated, where the reference case
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TABLE 2.2
Release Conditions for Reference Case and Sensitivity Study
Parameter Reference Case Range of Variation:
Sensitivity Study
release magnitude
(percent of total
inventory)
time between shutdown
and release (hrs.)
warning time to
evacuate (hrs.)
energy release rate
(cal./sec.)
release height (m.)
duration of release
(hrs.)
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.1 - 3.0
0.25 - 1.0
0.25 - 1.0
104 - 107
1 - 2525
0.5 - 10.0
}
3.0
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denotes the one used in the preliminary example calculations
of system reliability requirements.
It was found that the consequence magnitudes were
strongly dependent on certain conditions and parameter values.
The reactor site population distribution and the release
magnitude were the most influential parameters. The time
delay between shutdown and release, the warning time to
evacuate, the energy release, the duration of release, and
the release height all had secondary effects on the conse-
quence magnitudes. Table 2.3 summarizes the influence of
these parameters.
To determine the actual reliability requirements, or
admissible failure rates, the fusion reactor accident conse-
quences must be compared to similar risk assessments for
systems posing acceptable public hazard levels. Using the
results of the Reactor Safety Study1 to establish an accept-
able hazard level for nuclear power generation, a probability
distribution function for a particular fission reactor
accident consequence can be compared with a normalized prob-
ability distribution function, or "risk profile," for the
fusion reactor accident, to graphically produce a maximum
admissible failure rate. This maximum tolerable frequency
of occurrence prevents the public risks associated with a
particular fusion reactor accident, or set of accidents,
from exceeding the risks calculated for fission reactors.
The same technique could be used to compare risk profiles
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TABLE 2.3
Sensitivity of Consequence Magnitudes to Various Release Conditions
Parameter Increased Change in Consequence Magnitudes
population density increase
release magnitude increase
time between shutdown decrease
and release
warning time to evacuate decrease
energy of release increase
release height increase for illnesses;
decrease for fatalities
duration of release consequence increase for
release durations of up to
several hours (exact time
depends on release magnitude),
then decrease f'or longer
durations
*
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for fusion reactor accident consequences with other similar
risk assessments that have been deemed to represent an
acceptable level of risk.
As an example, Figure 2.2 contains the early fatality
probability distribution curve for a fission plant on a
highly populated site with particularly unfavorable weather
conditions. Plotted on the same graph is the probability
distribution profile for the same health effect consequence
resulting from the release of about 1% of the Tokamak reactor
inventory of stainless steel activation products. The fusion
reactor is on the same site and the release occurs with the
same weather conditions used for the fission reactor, and
the release conditions are those of the reference case. The
fusion curve is normalized in the consequence model because
a frequency of occurrence equal to one per reactor-year is
assigned to the release. The comparison process consists of
placing the normalized curve on the probability-consequence
graph as far up on the probability scale as is possible while
remaining totally beneath the fission curve. The ordinate
intercept, which in this case is 10~4 per reactor-year,
determines the maximum allowable probability for the releases.
It must be emphasized that these curves have been developed
and used to demonstrate a methodology and should not be
considered as having any significance in a risk assessment.
The same fusion reactor consequence probability profile
may be compared to the early fatality complementary cumu-
lative cistribution function for all fission
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Figure 2.2
An Example of the method to Determine maximum Admissible Failure
Rates Using Fission Risk Functions and Fusion Risk Profiles
Early Fatalities: Using the Highly Populated Site Fission Curve
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reactors at the various sites and with the spectrum of weather
conditions employed in the Reactor Safety Study. An allowable
failure rate of 10~ per reactor-year is then obtained
revealing the inherent conservatism in using only the highly
populated site for the fusion reactor. Further studies will
include the development of composite curves for fusion reactors
with various sites and weather conditions, providing a more
valid comparison with the composite fission curves. Similar
results are obtained from Figure 2.3 in which early
illness probability distribution curves are compared. The
preliminary reliability results are summarized in Table 2.4.
A particularly interesting relation between the admissible
release rate and the release magnitude is shown in Figure 2.4.
The two curves are derived from a series of normalized early
fatality and early illness probability distribution profiles
for various magnitudes of activated steel releases from a
Tokamak reactor on a highly populated site, which were compared
with the two corresponding probability distribution functions
for fission reactor accidents on the same site with the same
weather. The curves in Figure 2.4 reveal that the reliability
requirements for the fusion system are very sensitive to the
possible release magnitudes, and that releases of more than
approximately 2% of the steel activation product inventory
should be limited to the very low rates of less than 10-6 per
reactor-year.
-33-
Fiqure 2.3
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TABLE 2.4
Exemplary Reliability Requirements from Comparisons of Fission
Risk Curves and Fusion Risk Profiles
Fusion Profiles Fission Curves Admissible Failure
Rate
(1% inventory release) (from WASH-1400) (per reactor-year)
early fatalities:
early fatalities high pop. site 1 x 10~4
early illnesses:
early illnesses high pop. site 7 x 10-
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Fiqure 2.4
Sensitivity of the Exemplary Reliability Requirements to the
Stainless Steel Activation Product Release Magnitudes
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A similar methodology can be used to investigate other
possible structural materials. Initial considerations of a
TZM first wall have been undertaken.6 Analysis of the
response of first wall materials to an energy dump reveal
that the relative melting rates for TZM and stainless steel
depend on the rate of the energy dump. For an energy dump
during which material ablation does not occur, TZM melts
faster than the steel. If material ablation is involved,
the steel will have the higher melting rate. Since the
molybdenum alloy has a larger BHP value associated with its
induced activity, it appears that TZM may pose a greater
hazard than the stainless steel when considering release
accidents. Further study will investigate the effects on the
consequences and reliability requirements of this material
choice.
Future efforts concerning the potential hazards of
induced radioactivity will center on the determination of
important parameters describing possible release accidents
in Tokamak systems. Knowing these parameters with greater
certainty, more realistic consequence calculations may be
performed and the subsequent reliability requirements may
serve as a valid basis for system designs. Most importantly,
however, a methodology with which a radiological hazard may
be translated into system reliability requirements will be
demonstrated.
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2.3 Tritium Radioactivity Releases
One of the most abundant radioisotopes which will be
present in fusion reactors operating with the deuterium -
tritium fuel cycle is tritium, an isotope of hydrogen that
decays via beta emission with a half life of 12.36 years.
Tritium inventories in proposed fusion reactor designs
range from 5 to 36 kilograms (about 5 x 107 to 36 x 107
curies). In the latter case, this amount represents about
three times the present (1977) natural, steady-state inven-
tory of the atmosphere. Boiling water reactors release from
1 to 100 Curies/reactor/year whereas pressurized water reac-
tors release about 600 Curies/reactor/year. In 1963 the
total tritium inventory in the atmosphere went as high as
7
2000 MCi because of atmospheric weapons testing.
A limiting factor in fusion reactor environmental impact
and safety research is the lack of detailed design data. The
UWMAK-III conceptual Tokamak fusion reactor has been examined
for tritium hazards since the design report for this reactor
has the most developed tritium handling system described for
fusion reactors.4 The analysis of the tritium hazards in the
UWMAK-III reactor design will in a large part be applicable
to other conceptual fusion reactor designs using a D-T fuel
cycle.
There are four types of coolant used in the UWMAK-III
design. The inner hot shield is cooled by helium gas which
is circulated in a closed cycle to a helium turbine which
produces 585Mw(e).
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Energetic tritons and alpha particles diffusing from the
plasma are diverted via magnetic fields and impinge on the
divertor section of the vacuum chamber. The heat deposited
in the divertors is transferred via a liquid sodium loop
through a steam generator to a conventional Rankine cycle
steam turbine system which produces 285 Mw(e).
The plasma operates on a deuterium-tritium cycle and for
this reason it is desirable to breed tritium in the reactor.
This is accomplished by the use of liquid lithium as a blanket
material in the outer portion of the torus. The 14.1 Mev neu-
trons produced by the fusion reaction interact with the lithium
via:
6 Li + n = He + 3H.
The liquid lithium then goes to an intermediate sodium heat
exchanger and this sodium then flows through a sodium-helium
heat exchanger. The hot helium is then used to drive two
turbines which are identical to the turbine used in the inner
blanket power cycle.
The fusion reaction in the Tokamak is pulsed with a
plasma burn time of thirty minutes. The duty factor of the
power cycle is 95%. During the down time of the cycle it is
necessary to provide a thermal storage medium so that the
production of electricity in not interrupted. The intermediate
sodium serves in this capacity. The total power system uses
dry cooling towers for waste heat rejection. The power cycle
flow diagram is shown in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 Flow Diagram for UWMAK-III
(from Reference 4)
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2.3.1 The Tritium Fueling System
The tritium extraction system in UWMAK-III has been de-
signed to maintain a tritium partial pressure in the contain-
ment of 7.6 x 10-1 Torr. This is achieved by back-designing
the coolant system and fuel extraction devices to insure loss
rates to the building environment of less than 1 Curie per
day. The tritium handling facilities of the UWMAK-III system
are outlined in Figure 2.6.
The steady-state tritium concentration in the lithium is
about 2.08 ppm. The circulation rates and inlet and outlet
temperatures of the heat transfer fluids are shown in Figure
2.5. The lithium passes over a niobium-palladium-yttrium
"window" designed like a heat exchanger and the tritium dif-
fuses through the window. The tritium then emerges on the
downstream side where it catalytically reacts with oxygen in
a flowing helium stream. The T2 0 is then adsorbed on
molecular sieves and the helium and oxygen are recycled.
The sieves are regenerated by heating and the T2 is sent to
the tritium storage area. As is the case with most of the
fuel separation columns in the UWMAK-III system, this section
is operated in tandem modes--while one set of adsorbers is
collecting tritium, the other set is regenerating.
The production of tritium in the liquid lithium is accom-
panied by the production of an equal amount of helium. Impuri-
ties cleanup and helium venting would require diversion of
about 1% of the lithium flow whereas the tritium extraction
system would require diversion of about 5% of the total lithium
flow.
Figure 2.6 Tritium in UWMAK-III System
(from Reference 4)
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Tritium diffuses into the sodium IHX and into the sodium
in the divertor power system. This tritium must be extracted.
In both cases, the cold leg sodium will react with a yttrium
getter bed system operating in tandem modes.
Tritium can form in the inner shield via neutron inter-
action with the boron in the boron carbide. This tritium can
diffuse into the inner blanket helium coolant. Since this
helium goes directly to the turbine hall it must be continually
processed for the removal of tritium.
The tritium extracted from the lithium blanket flow is
transferred to the T2 storage.facility. The T2 is stored in a
gaseous form, under pressure, in an austentitic stainless steel
tank. The tritium extracted from the yttrium beds and the
helium cleanup system must first be purified before use as a
fuel.
Solid fuel pellets are injected into the torus during the
burn cycle. 1.63 kg of T2 and 1.085 kg of D2 are injected dur-
ing the burn. Only 0.620 kg of T2 and 0.413 kg of D2 are con-
sumed. The unburned fuel is collected in cryopumps and adsorbed
on molecular sieves. One set of cryopumps is in operation while
the other set is being regenerated. The process stream is puri-
fied and the various hydrogen isotopes are separated and sent to
storage.
The total tritium inventory in UWMAK-III is reported to be
35.8 kg. A complete description of the tritium handling system
can be found in the reference design report.4
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2.3.2 Containment Systems and Equipment Locations
The plant schematic for the reference design is shown in
Figure 2.7. The four buildings that are of primary concern in
this analysis are the reactor containment building, the heat
exchanger building, the auxiliary building, and the turbine
hall. Only the latter does not have a specified emergency
detritiation system.
The emergency containment detritiation system is designed
to process the building atmosphere for tritium removal in the
event of a release. The buildings are designed to operate with
inert atmospheres but this may be neither economical nor practi-
cal. In any case, a normal atmosphere must be used for mainte-
nance operations.
Additional safety can be provided by the use of secondary
containment systems used to isolate components with high tritium
inventories. Techniques similar to those developed at Mound
Laboratories can be used to control tritium releases from such
components.9
The tritium bearing systems of major concern in the reactor
containment area:
Helium piping
Sodium piping
Lithium piping
Vacuum chamber
Cryopumps
Pellet Injection system
The sodium and helium piping are exposed to the reactor room.
The lithium piping is double walled to decrease the tritium
permeation rates and permit the passage of a helium sweep gas
through the annulus.
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Figure 2.7
Plant Schematic - UWMAK-III
(from Reference 4)
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The torus is composed of 18 removable sections which are
replaced every 2 years. Since some leakage is expected through
the seals, the design calls for a chamber to surround the torus,
field coils, and cryopumps. This chamber will be held at 75
Torr to reduce pumping losses. This chamber may need a detri-
tiation system. The pellet preparation system and the pellet
injector are also prime candidates for glovebox detritiation
systems because of their unusually high tritium inventories.
The tritium bearing systems of major concern in the heat
exchanger building are:
Helium piping
Main lithium piping
Diverted lithium piping
Divertor yttrium beds
IHX yttrium beds
Sodium impurities cleanup lines
Regenerators and hea.t exchangers
Sufficient design data is not available to determine whether
secondary containments are feasible in the heat exchanger build-
ing. Whereas the yttrium beds are located near the main sodium
lines, the regenerated tritium must be pumped to the auxiliary
building for purification. About 1% of the sodium from the
Divertor and IHX can be channeled to the auxiliary building for
cleanup. Likewise, 5% of the lithium stream can be diverted
to the auxiliary building for tritium extraction and cleanup.
The only tritium not contained in the liquid metal coolants in
the heat exchanger building is in the yttrium bed process
lines. The coolant tritium inventories would be released only
in the event of a sodium or lithium spill. Releases from these
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types of spills are under investigation.
All tritium fuel recovery, purification, and isotope
separation should be performed in the auxiliary building.
The major systems of concern are:
Li-Na-He cleanup systems
Tritium recovery from lithium
Tritium purification system
Isotope separation and storage
Each of these systems can be contained in an isolated glovebox
to minimize the hazards of tritium release. The possibility
of liquid metal fires exists in two of the containments while
the possibility of hydrogen explosion exists in the storage
area. The atmospheres of the gloveboxes and the auxiliary
building may be inert. It may be necessary to forego this
feature since some "hands-on" manipulation of the fueling
equipment may be desired. Nevertheless, the tritium recovery
systems require oxygen in the molecular sieves to catalyze
the tritium. This may increase the possibility of an explo-
sion.
The possible tritium releases, and hence, hazard
potential for the UWMAK-III system are listed in Table 2.5.
Estimates of the releases from major systems components are
designed to reflect a conservative viewpoint. The inventories
used are peak inventories, ignoring the fact that in a given
system the inventory may cycle from zero to peak as a function
of time. The estimates for releases from piping are based on
the inventory or the coolant from UWMAK-III design data.
Errors in these estimates may stem from:
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TABLE 2.5
Possible Tritium Release Inventories
Reactor Room Containment:
Helium Piping
Sodium Piping
Lithium Piping
Vacuum Chamber
Pellet Injector
Cryopumps
ND*
6.00 x 103
5.60 x 105 Ci/Loop
1.01 x 107
1.63 x 107
7.75 x 107
Heat Exchanger Building:
Helium Cleanup
Helium Piping
Diverted Sodium Piping
Diverted Lithium Piping
IHX Yttrium Beds
Divertor Yttrium Beds
Main Lithium Piping
ND
ND
2.00 x 103
5.00 x 105
1.60 x 103
5.10 x 103
5.60 x 105 Ci/Loop
Auxiliary Building
Cleanup Systems
Lithium Recovery System
Purification System
Storage and Isotope Separation
1.00 x 105
2.50 x 107
7.75 x 107
1.86 x 108
* Helium piping tritium inventories are crucially
dependent on the type of tritium cleanup system
used. This was not specified in UWMAK-III.
Curies
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Uncertainty in the tritium permeation rates
Inefficiencies in tritium cleanup devices
Surface adsorption of tritium on pipes
Uncertainty in breeding ratios
Lack of design data for valves and pumps.
The tritium released from coolant piping will probably. not
represent the principle hazard. The importance of such pipe
breaks relates to liquid metal fires which may be the initi-
ating event for serious tritium accidents.
Preliminary hazard diagrams for each of the three major
containment buildings are sketched in Appendix I.
2.3.3 The Chemical Forms of Tritium
The beta particle from tritium decay has a maximum energy
of 18 Kev and an average energy of 5.7 Kev. The maximum range
of the tritium beta in skin tissue is about 0.005 mm. This
is not sufficient to penetrate the dead epidermal skin layer of
the human body. External doses from tritium are negligible.
When tritium in the form of T2 or HT is inhaled in the lungs
about 0.4% will be retained in the body. All the tritium
inhaled in the oxide form (HTO or T20) will be retained.
Under conditions of uniform immersion in a cloud of HTO, the
amount of tritium transpired through the skin will equal the
amount absorbed by the lung tissue in a normal man. It is
therefore essential to specify the form of the tritium in
the dispersed plume following a reactor accident.8,1 0
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Four mechanisms exist for the conversion of HT to HTO;
namely,
1) Isotopic exchange with hydrogen
2) Autoradiolytic oxidation
3) Catalytic reaction on active metal surfaces
4) Reaction with 02 in the presence of a radiation field.
A summary of tritium conversion experiments is listed in Table
2.6. The rate constants, the orders of the reactions and
the experimental conditions reported by the investigators
are listed. Figure 2.8 is a plot of the conversion rate of
tritium to the oxide form versus initial T2 concentration for
the various experiments reported. Substantial disagreement
exists in the determinations of the rate constants, the order
of the reaction, and in the determination of the rate con-
trolling mechanism. In the latter case, Eakins and Hutchison
have demonstrated that the conversion rates are substanially
higher in humid air for a wide variety of conditions. This
suggests that the isotopic exchange process is dominant.
However, Belovodskii found that the conversion rates in air
with 50% humidity and in an argon-tritium-oxygen system were
nearly identical, leading him to conclude that the dominant
process was radiolytic oxidation.11
Two cases of tritium accidental release from the Savannah
River Plant are described in Table 2.7. On May 2, 1974, a
479,000 Ci release of T2 from a 200 ft exhaust stack occurred. 1 2
A tritium forms sampler located at Springfield, S.C. (the
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TABLE 2. 6
Summary of Tritium Conversion Work
Investigator Conditions Rate Constant Order
Dorfman
(1955)
Casaletto
(1962)
Yang
Gevantman
(1964)
Eakins
Hutchinson
(1973)
2T2 + 0-*2T 20
Oxidation at
high tritium
concentrations
2T + 0 -+2TO2 2
Oxidation at
T2 (0) between2
10 and 1
curie/liter
T + H 0+2 2
HT + HTO
Isotopic
exchange in
inert atmo-
sphere
Oxidation in
dry air
100% humidity
in air
Brass:
Dry
Humid
Steel:
Dry
-41.2 x 10 /min.
-51.03 x 10 L
Ci-min.
2.5 x 10 L
Ci-min.
-50.933 x 10 L
Ci-min.
-54.83 x 10 L
Ci-min.
-51 x 10 L
Ci-min.
-31. 43 x 10 L
Ci-min.
7 x 10-5 L
Ci-min.
2
2
2
2
2
-51-
TABLE 2.6 (cont.)
Investigator Conditions Rate Constant Order
Steel:
-3
Humid 1.01 x 10 L 2
Ci-min.
Aluminum: 5
Dry 6.5 x 10 L2
Ci-min.
-4
Humid 1.6 x 10 L 2
Ci-min.
Platinum:
Dry 4 x 10 L 2
Ci-min.
-2
Humid l.4 x 10 L 2
Ci-min.
Belovodskii Oxidation d (HTO)
(1975) isotope dt
exchange T (0) -6 5/3
between 2  10 CT
-3 310 and 10 Ci 5/3
ci/L Li-min.
C in curies
T
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Figure 2.8 Experimental Observations of T2Conversion Rates
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TABLE 2.7
Savannah River Release Incidents
5/2/74 12/31/75
Amount of Release
Form at Release
Location of oxide
(HTO) Detector
479,000 Ci
Springfield,
S.C., 20 miles
(5 Hr.) Down-
wind of Plume
Centerline
182,000 Ci
in stack
% Detected as
Oxide
Duration of
Release
Exhaust Flow
Total Liters of
Air in Mixture
Average T2 Conc.
T(o) (Total Mixing)
[T2] at Fencepost
Curies (HTO)
Formed
Curies (HTO)
Formed Per Liter
Curies (HTO)/L-Min
0.213%
4 min. (99%)
135,000 ft3/min
13,804,034
13 PPM (Vol)
.0347 Ci/L
ND
1020.27
7.39 x 10- 5
1.85 x 10- 5
0.6%
1.5 Min (90%)
135,000 ft 3/min
5,637,500
12 PPM (Vol)
.032 Ci/L
10~7 Ci/L
1092
1.92 x 10~4
1.28 x 10~4
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plume centerline) showed a relative HTO-HT concentration of
0.2% after five hours from the time of release. Assuming
that all the HTO formation occurred in the stack during the
four minute residence period, the tritium conversion rate
is much higher (orders of magnitude) than the reported con-
version rates, as shown in Figure 2.10.
During the release of December 31, 1975, stack gas
monitors detected that 0.6% of the 182,000 Ci released was
in the oxide form.13 Furthermore, the report states that
the oxide was probably formed after the release incident.
A similar analysis for this release is presented in Table
2.7. The results are plotted in Figure 2.8. Once again,
prediction and actual operating experience differ by several
orders of magnitude. The uncertainty in the SRP data casts
some doubt on the validity of the comparisons. However, the
degree of discrepency indicates that a need for experimental
verification of the tritium conversion rate is required.
Some of the tritium in proposed fusion reactor designs
will already be in the oxide form. The best example is
tritium cycled through molecular sieves or dessicant beds.
This tritium represents a greater hazard than tritium in
the elemental form. In the event of a fire or an explosion,
the conversion of the T2 to the oxide form will be nearly
complete. Data from nuclear explosive tests appears to
support this contention.10 Oxygen must be assumed to be
present if the containment ruptures or if the accident occurs
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during maintenance operations. Additionally, the requirement
of an inert atmosnhere is not rigid so that come containments
may be operated with normal atmospheres.
For steady-state releases, the tritium must travel a
release pathway which will in most circumstances result in
tritium in the oxide form. For instance, tritium may diffuse
from the divertor sodium into the steam generator and eventually
end up in the condenser water. Tritium passage through water
results in almost complete conversion to the oxide form. Low
level steady-state tritium emissions can be characterized by
long tritium migration times and releases via piping in the pow-
er cycles which will come in contact at some point with con-
denser water.
A large spectrum of possible tritium releases can be en-
visioned. They extend from low level steady-state tritium-oxide
emissions through larger releases of T2 ' HT or HTO in accident
modes to possible large level HTO releases under "worst case"
accident conditions.
The chemical behavior of tritium during lithium or sodium
fires is an important concern. The chemical equilibrium code
TRAN72 has been used to investigate the potential behavior of
tritium during lithium fires. 4 A description of the code is
given in Section 3.2.2. One of the main assumptions of the
thermodynamic model is that equilibrium has been reached. All
of the free energy liberated goes into the formation of pro-
ducts at the equilibrium temperature. The chemical behavior
of the lithium-nitrogen-oxygen-hydrogen system has been examined
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with emphasis on the chemical composition of the hydrogen
products. Tritium was taken to be the only isotope of hydro-
gen in the system.
Tables 2.8 to 2.12 list the various hydrogen products
formed, their relative percentage of all hydrogen products,
and the equilibrium temperature of the reactants for a wide
range of lithium to air and hydrogen to air molar ratios.
The principal forms of the hydrogen released appear to be
LiH, LiOH, H 20, and H Lithium hydride is a solid below
953 OK whereas LiOH solidifies below 723 0 K. The decomposi-
o 15 otion temperatures of LiH and LiOH are 1245 K and 1197 0<
respectively. Under certain initial conditions, the tempera-
ture of the reaction is below the melting points.of these
materials. In these cases, the tritium release may be
decreased on account of the condensible nature of these gases.
A single loop of the UWMAK-III lithium heat removal
system contains about 3.16 x 106 moles of lithium. The
containment volume is capable of containing 1.12 x 107 moles
of air at STP. Under the equilibrium assumptions, with
complete mixing, the lithium to air molar ratio is about
0.282. Figure 2.9 shows the behavior of the principal
hydrogen products at various hydrogen to air molar ratios
for the lithium to air molar ratio of 0.212.
As an example, consider the release of the tritium
inventory in one of the cryopumps (7.75 x 10 Ci). For a
lithium fire involving the loss of the lithium in only one
TABLE 2.8
Percent of Hydrogen Released Which Forms the Designated Product Versus
for (Li)/(AIR) =
(H2 )! (AIR)
0.0021
(Al)
(AIR)
1 1 1 V I I u
.00106 1.0021 2 .01 .0212 05 .212 .5
.9 2.12 21.19
PRODUCT ____
.465 .096
H .005 15.785 52.963 80.085 93.225
f2 0 50 89.4 95 97.9 99.420 83.113 46.811 19.91 1.990
oi .075 .436 .008
N3  ____.004 4.781
Li2 0 2H2
Lill
Lil (s)
LiOl, 
.499 .201 .113
LiOll (s) 100 50 10.6 5 2.1 
.005
T (OK) 335 344 408 497 714 1656 2382 2025 1404 511
(I
'.4
TABLE 2. 9
Percent of Hydrogen Released Which Forms the Designated Product Versus (H2)/(AIR)
for (Li)/(AIR) = 0.0212
(H)
(AIR) 00106 00212 01 .0212
I I Y I WI~
05 .212 .5 .9 2.21 21.19
PRODUCT
H .468 .092
H2  .005 17.438 53.984 80.494 93.591
H 20 .944 .475 4.16 50 90.423 94.904 79.715 44.78919.157 1.900
OH .102 .377 .008
NH3  .004 4.459
Li 2 02H2  .021 .014
LiH 001
LiH(s)
LiOll 4.973 2.000 1.127 .330
LiOH(s) 99.056 99.525 95.84 50 9.577 .050
T( K) 542 554 642 727 889 1704 2373 2017 1414 515
Lnf
cx0
TABLE 2.10
Percent of Hydrogen Released Which Forms the Designated Product Versus
for (Li)/(AIR) = 0.212
(H2 ) / (AIR)
(H)
(AIR) .001061 .00212 .01 0212 .05 .212 .5 .9 2.12 21.19
PRODUCT
H .014 .350 .055 .003
112 .148 34.324 63.980 84.961 96.56
1120 2.0 4.489 6.676 26.513 36.07250.844 46.136 24.938 13.325 1.001
OH 0.5 .499 .531 .452 .377 .575 .069 .002
NH 3  .002 1.930
Li 20 2 H2  .106 .151 .216 .077 .008 .038 .028
LiHl .025 .017 .001
LiH(s)
LiOH 97.5 97.01 82.687 72.885 63.33r48.343 19.087 10.970 1.678
LiOH (s) .500
T( K) 1846 1845 1843 1845 1870 2103 2243 1927 1607 565
(I
TABLE 2.11
Percent of Hydrogen Released Which Forms the Designated Product Versus (H2 )/(AIR)
for (Li)/(AIR) = 1.06
(H)
(AIR) .001061.00212 01 .0212 05 .212 .5 9 2 .12 21.19
PRODUCT
H .339 .292 .347 .472 .500 .251 .131 .031
H2  .208 1.614 55.407 81.717 91.389 98.416 99.352
H O .146 .485 1.401 3.125 1.809 1.008 .192
OH .339 .219 .173 .076 .004
NH3  .003 .148
Li202H2 .024 .012 .008 .002
LiH .073 .139 .289 1.046 .776 .536 .246
LiH(s)
LiOH 100 99.322 99.271 98.648 96.14739.893 15.435 6.929 1.110
LiOH (s) .500
T( 0 K) I 2483 2470 2449 2383 2182 2092 2015 18432484
1* 1 1 I. 1 1 I 4 I
746
0
Percent of Hydrogen
TABLE 2.12
Released Which Forms the Designated Product Versus (H2)/(AIR)
for (Li)/(AIR) = 2.12
(H)
I (AIR)
I I I I I L
00106 .00212 01 0212 05 212 5 .9 2.21 21.19
PRODUCT
H .057 .245 .006 .003 .002
112 49.44 60.23 79.03 84.65990.024 95.074 96.878 97.907 98.990 96.866
H20
OH
NH3 
.005 .003 .034
Li 202 12
Lill 50.56 39.77 20.97 14.772 9.927 4.865 3.093 2.086 1.007
LiHl(s) 3.000
LiOH 
.245
LiOH (s)
T( K) 1651 1651 1648 1645 1636 1586 1515 1490 1426 896
a'j
I
Figure 2.9 Hydrogen Product Chemical Form as a Function of
(H2 )/(AIR) Molar Ratio for (Li)/(AIR) = 0.212
(Li)/(AIR) = 0.212
H2
LiOH
7~
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
10.0
(H2 ) / (AIR)
H20
10-3 10-2 10-1 1.0 10 2
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of the 18 coolant loops in the UWMAK-III system, a hydrogen
to air molar ratio of 3.5 x 10~4 results. Figure 2.9 shows
that the limiting behavior of the products at low hydrogen
concentration favors the formation of condensible hydrogen
hydroxide. At high concentrations (corresponding to tritium
releases which are in confined spaces) a trade off begins
between the formation of lithium hydroxide and water. Of
course, if the fire occurs in a confined space the lithium
to air molar ratio may be higher than 3.5 x 10 4. At much
higher hydrogen to air molar ratios, more hydrogen is avail-
able than can be consumed in the reaction.
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III. LITHIUM FIRES
3.1 Introduction
At present, many tokamak fusion reactor designs use
liquid lithium as coolant and breeding material because of
its low melting point, high boiling point, low vapor pressure,
low density, high heat capacity, high thermal conductivity,
and low viscosity. Lithium requires less pumping power when
flowing across magnetic field lines than most other liquid
metals, and lithium is not activated to long-lived gamma
emitting isotopes by neutron capture.1
However, liquid lithium reacts strongly in air, liber-
ating about 3.7 times more energy on a weight basis than
liquid sodium (which is itself being considered for use in
the secondary loop). Lithium temperatures as high as 982 0 C
will be reached in some designs where a refractory metal or
alloy is employed as structural material.2
Should a large amount of liquid lithium become exposed
to air within the reactor containment building, there is a
potential for release of substantial amounts of energy, as
can be seen in Table 3.1. Furthermore, lithium may interact
with the concrete floors or structures, releasing even more
energy. The designer of the reactor containment has to take
such hypothetical accidents from lithium spills into consid-
eration. Whereas a nitrogen atmosphere can be introduced
into the containment to smother sodium fires, this would not
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TABLE 3.1
Energy and Heat Sources and Sinks in UWMAK-I and III
UWMAK-I UWMAK-III
Superconducting
magnets
Kinetic energy
of plasma
Thermal energy of
liquid lithium*
Li-air reactions
Li-concrete
reactions
Thermal energy of
gaseous helium*
350 x 109 J
3 x 109 J
32.5 x 109 J/%
280-731 x 109 J/%
1200 x 109 J/%
Li
Li
Li
.34 x 10J9 J
(from shield)
Approximately same
Approximately same
15.8 x 109 J/% Li
65-170 x 109 J/% Li
278 x 109 J/% Li
27 x 109 J
(inner blanket)
SINKS
Liquid helium*
Heat capacity
of air*
Heat conduction
through the concrete
containment
84 x 10 J
61.1 x 106 J/oC
.8-1.0 x 104 W (T-T )
0- amb
same
95.7 x 106 3oC
1.2 x 104 W (T-T )o amb
*Ambient is taken as zero-base in calculation of thermal energy
SOURCES
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be possible with lithium because of the exothermic lithium-
nitrogen reaction.3 Hence, an inert atmosphere of
other rare gases may have to be used to extinguish lithium
fires.
The UWMAK-I design includes a double containment.4
The inner primary containment is evacuated to a pressure of
1 Torr. It is designed to withstand an over-pressure of
10 psig caused by liquid helium coolant leakage and vaporiza-
tion. It would have a 0.5 in. steel liner to prevent lithium-
concrete reactions should a spill occur. The UWMAK-III design
utilizes a single containment of roughly one and one-half the
free volume of UWMAK-I (8.85 x 106 ft. 3 compared to 5.65 x 106
ft. 3). The containment atmosphere is an inert gas and the
structure is lined with 0.25 in. steel plate. The design
overpressure is 15 psig.
Air could be introduced into an otherwise evacuated
environment by a breach of the primary containment by a missle
or by seismic activity. In these cases it would be impossible
to prevent leakage of air into the containment and the main
concern would lie in minimizing lithium leakage and peak flame
temperatures. Also, under some circumstances, it may be pre-
ferable to operate with an atmospheric environment. If an
inert containment atmosphere were properly maintained, and
the steel liner was effective in separating the lithium from
concrete, a lithium spill by itself would pose little danger
to the containment integrity.
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Because the lithium would be contained in a multiplicity
of parallel systems (12 for UWMAK-I and 18 for UWMAK-III),
rupture of a single lithium system could not release more
than a small fraction of the total lithium inventory. However,
in absolute terms, this could amount to a large spill none-
theless (312,000 lbs. in UWMAK-I and 48,400 lbs. in UWMAK-III).
A spill of this size might cause large thermal stresses in the
steel liner possibly causing it to buckle and allowing lithium
to contact the concrete structure beneath. Lithium reacts
readily with concrete giving off hydrogen, oxygen, carbon
dioxide, and water vapor. Release of these gases might further
displace the liner, allowing still more leakage.
If a lithium spill occurs, the lithium's tritium inventory
would be released into the containment atmosphere creating a
radiation hazard. The lithium also contains activated blanket
wall erosion and corrosion products. If a fire occurs it is
possible that some products be volatilized and released into
the containment atmosphere. The fire might also supply the
energy needed to disrupt the first wall and other activated
reactor structures. Determination of peak flame temperatures
would show whether melting or vaporization of the structures
is possible. The radiological hazard combined with the very
large potential energy release necessitates that we gain a
detailed understanding of lithium fires.
In this section, the results of two scoping studies are
summarized. First, the adiabatic flame temperature due to
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Li reaction with oxygen and/or nitrogen has been estimated.
Such a temperature will not be achieved.under realistic
conditions due to the expected heat losses from the reaction
zone. This study utilized a generalized NASA code for flame
temperature analysis.5
Secondly, a parametric study of the lithium-air fire in
a containment building was conducted. The study utilized a
converted version of the SPOOL-FIRE code which was developed
at Argonne National Laboratory to analyze LMFBR sodium-fire
accidents. 6
3.2 Lithium-Air Reactions
3.2.1 Thermodynamic Considerations
The major concern with using liquid lithium as a fusion
reactor coolant is its exothermic reaction in air as well as
with the concrete containment should a lithium spill occur.
Unlike sodium, liquid lithium also reacts exothermically
with nitrogen gas at room and elevated temperatures. The
reactions of most interest in air at room temperature are:1
AH 9 8 kcal/mole AG 98 kcal/mole
2 Li(c) + 02 -* Li2O(c) -142.75 -133.95
2 Li(c) + 02 + Li202(c) -151.9 -133.1
Li(c) + H2 + 02 + LiOH(c) -116.58 -105.68
3 Li(c) + N 2 (g) + Li 3N(c) - 47.5 - 37.3
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where AH0 is the change in enthalpy between the products
and reactants (also known as the heat of formation), and
AG0 is the change in Gibbs free energy. Negative values
of AHO indicate exothermic reactions. The zero superscript
refers to enthalpy changes with respect to the standard
state (1 atmosphere of pressure).
The heat of formation AH0 is a function of reaction
temperature as well. Most thermodynamic data give values
of AH at room temperature (298.15 0K to be precise). How-
ever, one would expect the heat of formation at a given
temperature AH to more accurately reflect the energy re-
lease for reactions which occur at temperatures other than
298.150 K. Table 3.2 gives the heats of formation and the
change in Gibbs free energy of Li 2 O(c) and Li 3 N(c) for
various temperatures.
In any chemical situation the forward reaction may be
specified by
A + B - C
while the reverse reaction may be specified by
C + A + B.
At chemical equilibrium, one obtains the standard form
A + B -'C.
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TABLE 3.2
Heats of formation and changes in Gibbs free energy for
Li 3N (c) and Li 2O(c)
JANAF Thermochemical Tables
(Dow Chemical Co., Midland, Mich., 1970)
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Large negative values of AG indicate, in general, that theT
forward reaction goes nearly to completion, while large posi-
tive values of AG0 indicate that the reverse reaction isT
preferred thermodynamically.
One can represent a chemical transformation for ideal
gases, for example, by the equation
aA + bB ' cC + dD, (3.1)
where the lower-case letters represent the number of moles
and the upper-case letters represent the reactants and pro-
ducts. One can then represent AG 0 mathematically by
T
AG 0 = -RT ln K (3.2)
T
where
[C]c [D] d (3.3)
K [A]a [B]b
and is called the thermodynamic equilibrium constant. R is
the universal gas constant (1.987 cal./gm-mole 0K) and T
is the absolute temperature. The values in the brackets
refer to the corresponding mole concentrations of the pro-
ducts, while the lower-case letters are exponents in the
above expression for K. Hence, large negative values of
AG0 indicate relatively high concentrations of the productsT
C and D, and the forward reaction more nearly goes to
completion at chemical equilibrium.
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Gibbs free energy can more accurately be represented
by
G0 = H - TS0  (3.4)
while the change in Gibbs free energy is represented by
AG0 = AH 0 - TAS0  (3.5)T
for infinitesimal changes under isothermal conditions.
AS0 represents the change in entropy for the reaction in
the standard state. A more complete discussion of chemical
thermodynamics for reactions involving liquids, solids, and
changes in state is treated by Klotz8 for example.
3.2.2 Lithium-Air Flame Temperature and Energy Release
Of primary concern in lithium fires is the peak flame
temperature which can be achieved. To a large extent, this
will determine whether many radioactive species become air-
borne by vaporization or aerosol formation in fusion reactor
accidents. The standard procedure is to assume a number of
constraints on the lithium-air reaction to establish peak
flame temperatures - in essence, 1) reactant stoichiometry,
2) chemical equilibrium between the product species, and
3) overall adiabatic conditions. In reality, one can expect
significantly lower temperatures to be achieved because of
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radiative heat transfer and constraints on the reaction rates.
These further constraints will be considered later. However,
the present analysis does provide an absolute upper bound for
the flame temperature, albeit a very conservative one.
The procedure used in determining chemical equilibrium
is an established one and treated especially well by Zeggeren
and Storrey.9 In brief, the idea is to minimize Gibbs free
energy for all the reactants and products considered. It
is assumed that all of the energy released is used in heating
the product species to the equilibrium temperature.
According to Gibbs phase rule, the entire chemical
system can be specified by two independent variables. For
the calculation of adiabatic flame temperatures, pressure and
enthalpy are assumed independent. Moreover, the pressure is
fixed at one atmosphere for ease of calculation, leaving
only the enthalpy to be specified. The enthalpy for each
species is in turn a function of temperature.
Gordon and McBride5 have developed a special computer
program, CEC 71, for calculating thermodynamic values in
rocket engines. This code, developed for NASA, and available
at MIT under the name TRAN72, includes other options used in
studying jet propulsion, but are not considered here. Thermo-
dynamic and physical data for some 62 reactants and 421
reaction species in liquid, solid, and gaseous states are
included. The input requires specifying the reactant concen-
trations (by weight or moles) and the initial enthalpies
(or temperatures) of these reactants. The resulting output
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provides information on the product concentrations, equili-
brium temperature, density, effective molecular weight, and
so forth. Of greatest interest is of course the equilibrium
temperature, but the product concentrations further provide
information on which reactions are or are not predominant.
Using this computer code, a number of cases were run
under similar conditions but with slight changes in reactant
concentrations to note the contribution of the various
reactants to the total energy release.
In case 1, it is assumed that a leakage of 16% of the
total lithium inventory of UWMAK-III (about three coolant
loops) has resulted and reacted with the volume of air within
the containment. The reaction is assumed to occur with air
at room temperature, 1 atmosphere of pressure, and 50%
relative humidity. Case 2 was similar to case 1 but dry
air was used instead. Case 3 considered only lithium, oxygen,
and nitrogen as reactants. In case 4, only nitrogen and
lithium were used as reactants. Table 3.3 summarizes the
assumptions and the results of all four cases.
It is significant to note that the equilibrium tempera-
ture reached is quite insensitive to those reactants considered
other than nitrogen and oxygen. Further analysis shows that
in the presence of even the smallest concentrations of oxygen,
the percentage of nitrogen which underwent reaction is very
small. Several reasons can be given to account for this
observation.
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TABLE 3.3
Thermodynamic results from sample calculations
for determining adiabatic flame temperature.
INPUT
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Reactants Considered
and Mole Fractions
Li(1)
N
2
H20
Ar
CO
2
H
2
.45800 Similar
.41000 but
.11000 no H2 0
.01862
.00495
.00026
.00005
OUTPUT
Equilibrium 0K
Temperature
Energy Released
(kcal/gm Li reacting)
Products resulting
and mole fractions
(greater than
1 x 10-5)
Ar
Co
Co
2
Li
LiO
LiOH
Li2 (g)
Li2 (1)
Li2 0
Li 2 0
NO
N
2
0
02
Li 3N (s)
2498
10.4
.00722
.00010
.00028
.08670
.00767
.00014
.00006
.11990
.16524 .16524 .16703
.00156 .00156 .00158
.00446
.59579
.00452 -
.60024 .88433
.00131 .00131 .00133
.00957
.468
.419-
.113
.27
.73
2498
10.4
.00722
.00010
.00028
.08670
.00767
.00014
.00006
.11990
2500
10.4
.08767
.00778
.00006
.12012
1094
2.3
.00151
.00002
.00446
.59579
.00957 .00968
.11414
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For one, the lithium-oxygen reaction is significantly
more exothermic than the lithium-nitrogen reaction. Hence,
one would assume that in establishing equilibrium, reaction
with oxygen would be preferred over nitrogen. In addition,
the change in Gibbs free energy for the reaction is greater
for oxygen than nitrogen, indicating that the forward reaction
with oxygen is carried to greater completion than with nitro-
gen. Although the heat of formation of Li 3N is fairly con-
stant over a wide range of temperatures, the value of AGT
increases significantly with temperature. At 298 K, the
value of AG is -36.8 kcal/mole, while it increases to -17.3
kcal/mole at 800 0K and still higher to +3.8 kcal/mole at
1500 0K. This would indicate that the forward reaction of
lithium-nitrogen at elevated temperatures is very slow. Note
also that the melting point of Li 3N is 1123 0K so that Table
3.2 cannot be used above this temperature.
Close examination of.lithium-oxygen reaction, on the other
hand, shows that for Li 2O(c), AG0 = -134.3 kcal/mole at 298 K,
-118.1 kcal/mole at 800 0 K, and -95.4 kcal/mole at 1500 0K.
Hence, the forward lithium-oxygen reaction is still very impor-
tant at elevated temperatures. Indeed, these observations imply
that liquid lithium-nitrogen reaction would be important only
at relatively low combustion temperatures of 400-500 0 K, and
unimportant in the regime of temperatures above 1000 0K.
However, the fact that lithium-nitrogen reactions are exother-
mic at all temperatures still means that nitrogen would be
insufficient for the extinguishment of lithium fires.
-79-
Several other cases were investigated to determine the
effects of the relative mole fraction of Li-to-air and Li-to-
nitrogen on the final equilibrium temperature. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 illustrate this as well as the effect of the lithium
release temperature on the final temperature. Calculations
were made for lithium release temperatures of 1173 0K,
1000 0K, 800 0K, and 600 0K, but only the curves for 1173 0K
and 600 K are plotted. The peak flame temperature obtained
for lithium fires in air is 2502 0K, while the peak flame
temperature for Li in N2 is 1315 0K. The value of 2502 K
compares quite closely with the value of 2400 K obtained by
Okrent et. al. 10 It was also found that for environments of
low oxygen concentration (4 and 8%), the peak flame tempera-
tures were reduced significantly to 1580 0K and 1800 0K .
respectively at Li release temperatures of 1173 0K. Moreover,
it was found that except for environments with extremely low
oxygen concentrations (< 1% volume), lithium-nitrogen reactions
were unimportant at chemical equilibrium.
This would lead to the following conclusions:
1) The lithium-oxygen reactions predominate in atmospheric
environments, while the lithium-nitrogen reactions are rela-
tively unimportant except at very low concentrations of oxygen.
2) In an N2 environment, lithium reacts exothermically
with the nitrogen gas, although the forward reaction is con-
strained by thermodynamic considerations, resulting in peak
flame temperatures which are significantly lower than those
found in an air environment.
Fig. 3.1 Equilibrium Temperature vs. Lithium
to Air Mole Ratio for Various Li
Release Temperatures
Equilib.
Temp.
(*K)
2600 O
2502 K
1173 *K
2200
00
600 OK
1800
1400
1000
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6
mole lithium
mole air
0 10 20 30
% Li Inventory (UWMAK-III)
Fig. 3.2 Equilibrium Temperature vs. Lithium to Nitrogen
Mole Ratio for Various Li Release Temperatures
1400
Equilib. 1315 *KT-emp.
("K)
1200 
1131
1000 600 OK
800
600
400.
mole lithium
mole nitrogen
Tambf
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 L.6
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The first conclusion suggests that it would be possible
to model lithium-oxygen reactions in an atmospheric environ-
ment in much the same way as was done in several studies
with sodium fires in LMFBR's. 6,11,12,13 This would make
it possible to predict the temperature-pressure history
of containment resulting from lithium fires. At lower oxygen
concentrations, the model would have to be modified to account
for lithium reactions with nitrogen.
Of considerable interest is the possible vaporization
of reactor materials in the event of a lithium fire. Table
3.4 gives the melting points and some vaporization points
for those metals considered likely to be used as first wall
or as structural material. It can be seen that even at
temperatures of 2502 0K (which is the highest peak flame
temperature calculated from this investigation), none of
the materials would vaporize, although several would melt.
Further study would have to be made to determine if aerosol
formation is significant at these temperatures when assessing
the overall mobilization of radioactive species. This is
especially important because of the generation of free oxygen
atoms. Free oxygen is highly reactive and may oxidize
several potential structural materials.
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TABLE 3.4
Melting and boiling points of some metals
being considered as first wall or structural materials
M.P. (K) B.P.(0 K)
Titanium 2000 3550
Molybdenum 2883 -
Zirconium 2125 3900
Aluminum 932 2600
Stainless Steel >1700 >3000
Niobium 2760 5000
Vanadium 1890 3800
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3.3 The Adaptation of SPOOL-FIRE Code to Lithium Fires
3.3.1 Sodium-Fire Computer Models
Because of the similarity between most alkali metal
fires, computer codes developed for analyzing liquid sodium
fires in LMFBR's can be modified to study liquid lithium
fires. In particular the SPRAY, 1 4 ,1 5 ,1 6 SOFIRE II,12
CACECO,13,17 and SPOOL-FIRE6' 1 8 codes have been considered.
With the exception of SPOOL-FIRE, the analytical modelling
behind these codes has been reviewed by Sarma et. al. 
1 9
'
2 0
A liquid metal fire caused by a piping rupture would
probably consist of two parts, a spray fire as the coolant
is rapidly expelled out of the broken piping, and a pool
fire after the coolant has collected on the containment floor.
SPRAY utilizes a dynamic combustion zone model about a moving
spray droplet to provide the time-temperature-pressure history
of a spray fire. CACECO models a combined spray-pool fire
within a four-cell containment. Heat and mass may be trans-
ferred between all cells and between each cell and the ambient
exterior. Options include sodium-concrete reactions, water
release from heated concrete, ventilation in and out of the
containment, emergency space cooling and the effects of
equipment heat sinks within the containment. SOFIRE II is a
two cell pool fire code which models the containment heat
transfer using the finite difference technique. SPOOL-FIRE
is an adaptation of SOFIRE II model converted to the IBM CSMP
method of formulation combined with a simple spray fire model
first proposed by Humphreys. 2 1
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The version of the code which was received from Argonne
National Laboratory is described in detail in the next sec-
tion. Table 3.5 summarizes the options available in each
code. The SPOOL-FIRE code was chosen in this initial study
because of its use of the IBM-CSMP methodology which
makes it relatively easy to modify. Proposed modifications
will also be indicated in the next section.
3.3.2 Description of the Spool-Fire Model and
Modification Needs
SPOOL-FIRE is a computer code developed at Argonne
Laboratory to describe the temperature and pressure history
within a containment building resulting from a sodium fire.
The code accounts for heat loss from the building, and con-
tainment atmosphere leakage caused by over-pressurization.
The code's use of the IBM-CSMP methodology allows the model
used to be readily changed by the user.6
3.3.2.a Spray Fire Model:
The spray fire is modeled by assuming that a fixed
amount of lithium reacts instantaneously, adiabatically, and
stoichiometrically with the oxygen in the containment atmo-
sphere. The equilibrium temperature of the components 1, 2
... , i, ... n of the resultant mixture is then given by:
f/T n 
T f
ML CL dTL + M Q = M.fT m C. dT. (3.6)
0 i=1
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TABLE 3.5
Summary of Desired Features for Lithium Combustion Model
and Applicable Sodium Fire Computer Codes
SA I I
SPRAY SOFIRE-II CACECO SPOOL-FIRE
/
V
Desired Feature
1) Lithium-nitrogen reactions
2) Spray fires
3) Pool fires
4) 0 to 21 % w/o oxygen
5) Gas ventilation into
containment
6) Gas ventilation out of
containment
7) Multi-cell containment
8) Temp.-press. history
9) Humidity effects
10) Emergency space cooling
1 1) Gas leakage from overpressure
12) Pool drain tank
13) Equipment heat sinks
14) Extinguishment of fire by
chemical addition
15) Dissociation of reaction
products
16) Two mechanisms of mass
transfer
17) Inclusion of combustion zone
16) Aerosol effect on thermal
radiation
19) Easy modification of equations
cells
"/
V
4 11s
Ve
I cell
~~1
V
I
2
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where M = mass
C = specific heat = f(T)
T = temperature
T0= initial atmosphere temperature
T = lithium spill temperature
p
Tf = final mixture temperature
QC= heat of combustion
Substitution of the formulae for C as a function of tempera-
ture of 021 N2, and Li20, and carrying out the integrations
leads to a fourth order polynomial of which the positive
real root constitutes the desired solution. The intricate
subroutine (ROPE) supplied by ANL to find all the roots of
eq.(3.6) was replaced at MIT with a simpler iterative tech-
nique, which finds only the desired root. The results from
both methods were checked and found to be in agreement.
The amount of lithium which reacts as spray must be
provided by the user. To calculate this analytically would
be very difficult because it would be a function of droplet
size, speed, initial temperature, and the time between ejec-
tion and impact on containment walls or lithium pool. These
parameters are dependent on the specific accident, and are
determined by the size orientation, and location of the
break and the driving pressure differential. Krolikowski2 3
has studied explosive spray fires with very small droplets
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(% 572 y diameter) under very-large driving pressures.
Shire24 has studied spray fires resulting from sodium
being expelled from a nozzle and impinging on a flat plate.
This configuration results in much larger droplets (0.21 in.
diameter) but much lower droplet velocities. Both experi-
ments show only a small fraction (5%) of a sodium spray
will react before the spray imparts a solid boundary. It
may be possible, however, to postulate conditions under
which a larger fraction of the spray is consumed. Although
the combustion rate and exposed surface area of sodium
droplets are very large, each droplet's time in flight is
very short. In such cases, the assumption of instantaneous
combustion seems reasonable.
There may be several conditions that will affect the
consequences of a liquid metal fire, but are not accounted
for in the SPOOL-FIRE model. First, it is likely that the
piping in which a break occurs will take a significant amount
of time to empty. Kastenberg et. al. suggest that it may
take on the order of one hour for a blanket segment to drain
during a LOCA, if the magnetic field remains active during
drainage.25 Some energy may be transferred out of the con-
tainment and the containment temperature and pressure may
decrease. Secondly, at present only one combustion product
may be used in the SPOOL-FIRE code. Possible nitrogen
reactions are not included and no attempt is made to find
the chemical equilibrium of the reaction products. The
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assumption that the product is 100% Li 202 leads to the
largest heat of combustion. Li 3N has a much lower heat of
combustion, and would release less heat on a per weight
basis than Li 20 or Li202 . As discussed in the preceeding
section, under very low oxygen concentration conditions,
the reaction with nitrogen should be accounted for. Thirdly,
the presence of moisture in the atmosphere should be ac-
counted for. Water acts as a catalyst for the oxygen and
nitrogen reactions as well as reacting with lithium itself. 26
Under very dry conditions near lithium's melting point the
reaction might be slowed by the lack of moisture.
Future modifications of this code in the spray-fire
area should include:
a) a rate of spray release model;
b) a spray fire combustion model that would provide
the fraction of spray consumed in combustion;
c) a combustion model which included both oxygen and
nitrogen reactions in the proper propagation for chemical
equilibrium;
d) an accounting for the air humidity.
3.3.2.b Pool Fire Combustion Model:
The pool fire model assumes that the rate of lithium
combustion is determined by the rate of oxygen transport to
the pool surface. Assuming the usual mass transport-heat
convection analogy, the mass transfer coefficient for a
horizontal flat plate with the hot surface facing upward
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may be expressed asl2
h = .14 D [g Sc B 2 (T - T )] 1/3
fg
, ft./hr. (3.7)
where Sc = Schmidt number = u/D
D = diffusion coefficient
B = coefficient of gas expansion
u = kinematic viscosity
T - = surface temperature
T = gas temperature
The combustion rates can then be determined from
1 dm hf COX p RCMB/3600. = CMBR, lb. Li/sec-ft.2
Ap dt g (3.8)
where COX = mass fraction of oxygen in cell gas
RCMB = stoichiometric combustion ratio, lb. Li/lb. O2
CMBR = combustion rate
AP = pool surface area
Pg = gas density
The total heat release rate by combustion is then
Q = CMBR Ap Qc , BTU/sec.
The heat of combustion is deposited in the lithium pool and
the containment atmosphere in accordance with the value of
the constant FCMB such that
(3.9)
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Qpoo FCMB Q (3.10)
Q = (1 - FCMB) Q (3.11)
The value of FCMB must be supplied by the user. (The SOFIRE
II model implicitly assumes it to be 1.)
The spill is assumed to occur instantaneously at time 0.
The initial pool temperature is supplied by the user. The
initial atmospheric temperature and pressure are the results
of the spray fire computation.
This model has a number of deficiencies which should be
modified. At present, only one reaction product may be con-
sidered, Li20, Li202 ' or a fixed ratio of the two. In reality
Li 3N and LiOH may also be formed. The relative ratio of
products formed will vary with the temperature at which the
reaction takes place according to second law considerations.
Also it is possible that the products formed may later react
again or disassociate as their temperature changes. For
instance, Li202 has a decomposition temperature of 468 0K.
In a fire, if lithium behaves similiarly to sodium, it is
likely that initially Li 20 will be formed. As it cools it
may pick up another oxygen atom, releasing still more energy.
Li 3N forms very readily at lithium's melting point of
454 0K, but its free energy change, AG , varies very strongly
with temperature. AG 0 becomes positive around 1300 0K indi-T
cating that the reverse reaction 2Li3 N -~6Li + N2 becomes
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important. An accurate model of Li 3N formation is important
for two reasons: 1) it is necessary for calculating the
amount and rate of energy release. In low oxygen atmospheres,
Li 3N would be the main or only product. And 2) because Li 3N
is a very corrosive material, attacking common materials
including steel.26 Its corrosive action might cause the
containment's steel sheathing to fail allowing lithium to
contact concrete.
In pool fires of hydrocarbons, combustion takes place
in a combustion zone separated from and slightly above the
pool surface. 27,28,29 Fuel is carried to the zone by vapor-
ization, and oxygen by convection and diffusion. The heat
of combustion is transferred to the pool surface by radiation
and conduction, and to the atmosphere by convection and radia-
tion. Huber et. al.30 further suggest the existence of
such a zone for liquid sodium fires. If this is the case,
then it is likely that the combustion zone theory would also
describe lithium fires. The inclusion of such a model would
eliminate the need for the constant FCMB, the fraction of
heat transferred to the pool. In reality, FCMB is not con-
stant but depends on the emissivities of the pool surface,
combustion zone, and containment gas, and on the convective
heat transfer coefficient. These are all likely to change
with time as the fire progresses.
The present model makes no allowance for the release
of aerosols into the containment atmosphere, the deposition
of reaction products in the pool, or the rain-out of aerosols
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from the cell in which the fire takes place. The accumu-
lation of reaction product would change the heat capacity,
thermal conductivity, and emissivity of both the pool and
containment gas. The present model retains a constant mass
and constant pool thermal properties (those of lithium)
throughout the fire. The reaction products should cause
those to change with time. Lithium has been observed to
burn with a dense white smoke26 but the present model does
not include the effects of smoke and aerosol emission during
the pool fire. The reaction product of the spray fire is
assumed to be deposited in the containment gas and then
assumed to remain there during the pool fire. No allowance
is made for rain-out. Variable specific heats for N2 , 02'
and Li 2 0 or Li 2 02 are used. Allowances are made for con-
tainment leakage and for oxygen depletion by the fire.
Future modifications in the pool-fire area should
include:
a) inclusion of Li 3N and LiOH formation;
b) variation of reaction equilibrium with temperature
according to second law considerations;
c) the use of the combustion zone theory to calculate
the combustion rate and the release of energy into the con-
tainment gas and pool. The individual heat and mass transfer
mechanisms involved need to be better understood;
d) variation of thermal properties of the pool and con-
tainment gas caused by the deposition of reaction products;
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e) the use of a Li pool drain tank as an option.
Such a tank might be used to lessen the amount of energy
released into the containment;
f) inclusion of the use of chemical fire extinguishers
as an option. The effect of these chemicals will be strongly
dependent on pool temperature which controls disassociation
energies and rates. Some chemicals used might be graphite,
NaCl, and LiF.3
3.3.2.c Containment Thermal Model:
The basic containment model is shown in Fig. 3.3. The
model considers four major parts: the containment atmosphere,
wall structure, floor structure, and the lithium pool. These
are divided into a number of separate elements. Each element
is lumped into a single node. The nodes are interconnected
by thermal admittances equal to the reciprocal of the thermal
resistance between the elements.
The containment atmosphere is assumed to be a single,
well mixed mass. It therefore contains only a single node.
SPOOL-FIRE divides the pool into 4 layers each with a single
node. To prevent numerical instability and excessively
long run times caused by using very small elements, as en-
countered in our analysis, we have altered the code so that
only a single pool node is used. For the base case used,
the pool depth was only 0.51 inches. Considering the large
thermal conductivity of lithium, it seems from physical
considerations as well that a single node is enough. The
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-. 3.3 Basic Containment ModeL
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containment walls and floor have similiar structures, using
concrete sheathed with a plate steel liner. Heat transfer
through the structures is assumed to be one dimensional.
The liner is assumed to be separated from the concrete
surface by a small gas gap. Heat is transferred between
the two by conduction and radiation. The wall transfers
heat out to the ambient surroundings through a convective
surface film. The external surface coefficient is taken
to be 8.33 x 10-5 BTU/sec.-ft.2 - oF, a conservative figure
for natural convection. The SPOOL-FIRE model allows the
floor to reject heat to either the containment atmosphere or
the ambient surroundings. We have modified this by assuming
that the bottom of the floor is insulated. This is in
keeping with the .very small heat transfer that will take
place into the earth below the containment. For both the
floor and the wall, the steel liner was treated as a single
element and the concrete was divided into 20 elements.
Rebar and tensioning tendon5 embedded in the concrete were
not included. The thermal property values used in the code
are shown in Table 3.6. These are hard coded into SPOOL-FIRE
and are not easily changed.
The convection heat transfer coefficient from the pool
to the gas was calculated from the equation recommended by
McAdams. 3 1
h = 0.14 K (Gr-Pr)1/3  (3.12)
c L
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TABLE 3.6
Thermophysical Data used in
SPOOL-FIRE Heat Transport Calculations
Material Densit Specific Heat Thermal Conductivity
(lbm/ft (Btu/lbm-OF) (Btu/hr-ft-OF)
Carbon Steel
(liner)
Concrete
Lithium
Air (liner-
concrete gap)
490
144
27.4
0.2 30
0.156
1.0 36.3
0.015
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where
K = gas thermal conductivity
L = square pool side length
Gr = Grashof number based on the temperature difference
between the pool surface and the cell gas
Pr = Prandtl number evaluated for air at the average
film temperature.
Because of the high temperatures generated by the fire,
radiative heat transfer becomes very important. The SPOOL-
FIRE model includes radiation between the pool surface and
the containment atmosphere and walls and between the steel
liner and the concrete surface. The net radiation exchange
between any two surfaces is described by
Ql-2 EMNA A a(T 4 - T2 (3.13)
where
a = Stephen-Boltzman constant
A = surface area of either surface 1 or 2
EMNA = the radiation interchange factor between 1 and
2 based on surface area A
EMNA is a function of the emissivities of the two surfaces
and the view factor between the two. These functions are
derived below.
A schematic of the equilibrium radiative heat exchange
between the pool surface, the cell gas, and the cell walls
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is shown in Fig. 3.4. By circuit reduction, the heat
transfer from the pool to the walls is
A a (T p
p p
- T w)
l-E A 1-E
- + _p w +Ep Aw Ew (1-E ) + E /(l+Ap/Aw)
where F12 is the geometric view factor between surfaces
1 and 2. For this case, F
pg
If A << A , thenp w
A a(T p
p p
=F F
wg pw
- T w)
p-w 
~ l/E
By comparison with eq. (3.13)
EMNAC = Ep = radiative interchange factor between the
pool and the walls.
Similiarly the radiative exchange between the pool and
the cell gas is
A a(T
p p
Qp-g
- T )g
(3.16)
(3.17)1-E 1
E p + f~
p g
By comparison with eq. (3.13)
E E
pg9
EMNAG = E -E E +E
9 9 P P
radiative interchange factor
between the pool and the
cell gas.
(3.14)
= 1.
(3.15)
(3.18)
.AMINNIN- -
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Fig. 3.4 Equivalent Circuit for Radiation Heat Exchange
oetween Lithium Pool Surface. Cell Gas, and
Containment Walls
ApFpw(1-EW)
JwJp
I-E
E AD
rT 4
I-Ew
EwAW
1
p pg, A jFjq E
w 4
T 9
T = temperature (absolute)
J = radiosity
A = surface area
E = emissivity
F = view factor
r = Stephen-oltzman constart
subscripts
p = pool
w = containment steel liner
w = cell oas
= concrete surface
oT4
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From eq. (3.18), it is clear that EMNAG = 0 for E = 0
and EMNAG = E for E = 1. Thus, EMNAG is always less
p
than or equal to EMNAC.
The interchange factor between the liner and the con-
crete surface may be found from the equation for radiation
between two parallel infinite flat surfaces.
4 4
A (T - T )
Q =1w w c (3.19)ow-c 1+~2 - (319
E E
w c
By comparison to eq. (3.13)
EMNAW E EMNAB w Ec (3.20)EMNAW= EMAB =E +E -E E-
w c w c
where EMNAW = radiative interchange factor between the wall
liner and the concrete wall surface
EMNAB = radiative interchange factor between the floor
liner and the concrete floor surface
EMNAG, EMNAC, EMNAW, and EMNAB are treated as constants and
must be supplied by the user.
Some modifications to the thermal model should be made
to improve the accuracy of the representation of the physical
system, and to enhance the capability of the code. These can
be summarized as follows:
a) inclusion of forced ventilation of the containment as
an option. This would allow the flooding of the containment
with inert gas to extinguish the fire being studied;
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b) inclusion of equipment heat sinks within the contain-
ment;
c) inclusion of emergency space cooling as an option;
d) change EMNAG and EMNAC from constants to functions
of Ep and E which change as the pool fire progresses.
3.3.2.d Containment Pressure:
The pressure within the containment is calculated using
the ideal gas law. A correction is made for the depletion of
oxygen by the fire and for containment leakage. Modifications
for the depletion of nitrogen and for inert gas flooding
should be made.
3.3.2.e Containment Leakage
The equation used to describe the leakage rate through
an intact containment vessel structure is
LEAK K (OVERP)a , fraction of gas mass/sec. (3.21)
where
OVERP = containment over-pressure in psig.
While each containment will have its own unique leakage
characteristics, SPOOL-FIRE assumes that turbulent flow
through the leaks occurs so that a = 0.5 and K = 2.588
x 10 /sec-psi. These could be easily changed if needed.
The total leakage out of the containment is found by integrat-
ing the leakage rate. This gives the total fraction of the
gas mass released. This fraction may be applied to the total
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radioactive inventory within the containment to find the
total released dose.
An important modification which should be made is to
include an option which would account for leakage through a
break (hole) in the containment.
3.3.2.f Methodology of Solution (CSMP):
SPOOL-FIRE makes use of the IBM CSMP translator. 22
CSMP (Continuous Systems Modeling Program) allows the user
to model a physical problem using a set of ordinary differen-
tial equations with corresponding initial conditions. For
instance, the temperature of a thermal element may be found
from the solution to
mc dT = q + q2 + q3 + ... , T = T0 at t = to (3.22)
dt
where mc is the element's heat capacity and ql, q2 ' q '3 '
are heat flows into the element. This could also be expressed
as
t
T =f (q + q2 + q3 + ... ) dt + T0  (3.23)Jmc
t
0
In CSMP this is expressed as
T = INTGRL(T0 , dT/dt) (3.24)
Once the governing equations for the model have been
written, it is a relatively simple matter to write a CSMP
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program from them. The CSMP translator then translates that
program into Fortran, adds the necessary subroutines, and
then compiles and runs the resultant Fortran program. Because
an up-to-date version of the CSMP was not available, and to
cut down on computing costs, SPOOL-FIRE was edited so that
it would run in Fortran. A set of subroutines was then added
to do the integrations. Most of the CSMP methodology was
retained however. Two methods of integration were provided,
Simpson's Rule and Fourth Order Runge-Kutta methods. The
former was used for most calculations because it was faster,
and the latter was used as a check.
3.4 Application of SPOOL-FIRE to Lithium Fires in UWMAK-III
3.4.1 Description of UWMAK-III Containment
The UWMAK-III containment building is shown in Fig. 3.5.
The structure is reinforced concrete lined with 0.25 in. thick
steel plate. To prevent lithium fires, the containment will
have an inert atmosphere. The structure is designed to with-
stand a 15 psig over-pressure (caused by a liquid helium pipe
rupture). The structure would house the reactor, its piping
and immediate peripheries, e.g. neutral beam injectors etc.
Heat exchangers, energy storage devices, refrigeration equip-
ment, hot cells, waste storage, and other auxilaries would be
housed in separate structures located around the circumference
of the containment building. This is significantly different
from the UWMAK-I containment which utilizes a double contain-
ment. The reactor is located in the primary containment
-10 5-
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vessel and the auxilaries are located in the surrounding
secondary containment building.
For the sensitivity study reported below, the building
dimensions shown in Fig. 3.5 were used. The effect of varying
the building dimensions was not studied.
3.4.2 Discussion of Important Base Case Parameters
A sensitivity study of the consequences of lithium
spills was performed using the slightly modified SPOOL-FIRE.
The results are reported in the next section. An attempt
was made to realistically estimate the necessary input para-
meters. This was designated the base case. The parameters
were then varied individually to study the effects of the
resultant fire. The selection of values for these parameters
will be discussed in order of their importance. A summary is
presented in Table 3.7.
The initial containment gas composition was assumed to
be a normal atmosphere of 23.1% oxygen and 76.9% nitrogen by
weight. This was done in order to get some idea of the maxi-
mum consequences of a lithium fire and because SPOOL-FIRE at
present can only handle lithium-oxygen reactions. With an
inert operating atmosphere, only lithium-concrete reactions
could take place. If the containment were breached, the con-
tainment over-pressure would no longer be important since the
containment would already be vented to the outside. Cases
were run with 2%, 5%, and 10% oxygen weight percent in the
oxygen-nitrogen mixture.
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TABLE 3.7
Input Values for the Base Case
Spill size
Fraction of spill mass
consumed as spray
Lithium pool surface area
Oxygen content of cell gas
Reaction product
Heat of combustion
Fraction of heat of
combustion deposited in pool
Initial lithium spill temperature
Radiative exchange factors
Method of
Integration used
Simpson's Rule,
SPILL
SPRAY
= 48388 lbm. Li
= 1%
ASNA = 10387 ft 2
W02 = 23.1% by weight
100% Li 20
CMBR = 18510 Btu/lbm Li
FCMB
TNAI
EMNAC
EMNAG
EMNAB
EMNAW
IMETH
= .90
= 2256 0R
= .20
= .20
= 0.0
= 0.0
= 3
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UWMAK-III uses roughly 1/4 the amount of lithium that UWMAK-I
uses. This results from different blanket designs. In UWMAK-
III lithium is used only in the outer half of the torus blanket.
The inner half (guarding the donut hole) does not use lithium
and is helium cooled. Helium is also used to cool the inner
wall and the magnet shield. In UWMAK-I the entire blanket
uses liquid lithium. Both designs use a small amount of lith-
ium to cool the plasma divertors. UWMAK-III uses 18 toroidal
field coils. The blanket therefore consists of 18 modular
sections. We assumed that a header pipe broke in such a manner
as to drain one blanket section i.e. 1/18 (5.56%) of the total
lithium inventory is spilled. Because of lithium hold-up in
piping and the heat exchangers, one blanket section would con-
tain less than 1/18 of the total lithium inventory so that 1/18
is probably a conservative number. The lithium blanket sections
are supplied and drained by two ring-shaped headers, one above
and one below the reactor. These are connected to two lithium-
sodium heat exchangers in an adjacent building. It may be
possible that a pipe break could occur which would drain two
or more blanket sections. A break might also occur in the heat
exchanger building. The latter possibility was not investi-
gated. Spill size was varied to study its effect. Cases using
1.39%, 2.75% and 11.1% of the total lithium inventory were run.
The lithium pool area (ASNA) was chosen to be 25% of the
total floor area. Cable rooms surrounding the reactor form a
hot well of that size. It seems likely that the lithium
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spraying from a break would pool there. One case was run
using the total floor area.
The radiative interchange factors for the base case were
chosen by assuming the emissivity of the cell gas, Egas, to
be 1.0, the emissivity of the pool surface, ELi, to be 0.20,
and conservatively assuming that no radiation takes place
between the steel liner and the concrete surface. We have
been unable to find emissivity data for liquid lithium, so
we assumed that it has a low emissivity like that of other
liquid metals. Cases were run using ELi of 0.4 and 0.1, and
Egas of 0.28 and 0.17. One case was run using an emissivity
for steel of 0.85, and an emissivity for concrete of 0.90.
One run was also made using all large emissivities.
Because of the large thermal conductivity of lithium, the
fraction of the heat of combustion released in the pool (FCMB)
was taken to be 0.90. Cases were also run using FCMB equal
to 0.75 and 0.50. If a combustion zone model were included in
the code this input parameter would not be needed.
The blanket exit temperature of lithium in UWMAK-III is
2256 0 R. This was taken to be the spill temperature. Cases
were also run using spill temperatures of 1620 0R and 1260 0R.
Studies of sodium spray fires show that only a very small
fraction of the spray is consumed. Shire24 reports pressure
rises caused by a sodium jet impacting a deflector. In 5 of
the 6 cases reported, pressure readings indicate that no more
than 3% of the sodium reacted. In the sixth case, 15% may have
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reacted. The experiment was done- in low oxygen atmospheres,
and the average drop size was 0.21 inches in diameter. Kro-
likowski23 reports a calculation, for 572 micron sized drops
under large driving pressures, which shows less than a 2%
decrease in diameter. This would constitute less than 6%
decrease in mass. In a severe break only a small portion
would be sprayed. We assume 20%. If 5% of the spray is
consumed then only 1% of the total spill mass is consumed in
the spray fire. This was used as the base case. Cases were
also run using 0%, 0.5%, 2%, 3%, and 5%.
Several runs were made to study other effects. At high
temperatures the principle product is Li 2 0 and the base case
used 100% Li 20 as the reaction product. However, one case
was run using Li 20 2 which has a larger energy release. SPOOL-
FIRE assumes that the spill occurs instantaneously at time 0.
Kastenberg25 indicates that it may take 1 hour for lithium to
drain out of the blanket. The code was modified so that the
spill rate became a time function. One run was made assuming
that the spill rate decays exponentially. 1/18 of the total
lithium inventory was assumed to spill over a period of 3600
seconds which constituted 3 time constants.
In determining the rate of oxygen diffusion to the burning
zone of the pool, SPOOL-FIRE used the analogy between heat and
mass transfer to obtain eq. (3.7). The heat transfer coeffi-
cient, hc' and the analogous gas transport coefficient,
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h , were derived from the expression given by McAdams for
free convection from isothermal horizontal plates.32 The
expression is explicitly written as
Nu = 0.14 (Gr'Pr)1 / 3  (3.25)
and necessarily applies to horizontal plates with the heated
surface facing upwards, and for flows in the turbulent regime,
i.e.
Gr * Pr > 108 (3.26)
However, very little has been published for natural convection
inside containments in the turbulent region. Several experi-
mental investigations have been made for natural convection
heat transfer for fluids confined by two horizontal plates
and heated from below.3 3 ,3 4 ,3 5 Specifically, Jakob in his
analysis of the data of Mull and Reiker on air gives the rela-
tionship
Nu = 0.068 (Gr)1 /3  (3.27)
which, for Prandtl numbers of 0.71 for air, differs from eq.
(3.25) by a factor of two. Similarly, Globe and Dropkin ob-
tained the expression
Nu = 0.060 (Gr)/ 3 ((3.28)
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for air. Malkus, basing his relationship on the data of water
and acetone at room temperature, proposed the expression
Nu = 0.085 (Ra)0.325 (3.29)
where
Ra = Pr - Gr (3.30)
These investigations suggest that the heat and mass
transfer coefficients used by SPOOL-FIRE may be high by a
factor of two. Hence, one computer run was made using the
coefficient 0.07 in eq. (3.7) rather than 0.14, making the
necessary corrections in SPOOL-FIRE where applicable.
3.4.3. Results of Sensitivity Study
The important results of the sensitivity study are
compiled in Table 3.8. Because of the large thermal conduc-
tivity of both lithium and steel, the floor liner very rapidly
reaches a temperature approximating that of the lithium pool.
Hence, no separate column is provided in Table 3.8 for floor
liner. In the two cases run using a large EMNAB and EMNAW
(cases 24 and 25), the maximum concrete temperature occurred
in the walls. The temperature histories of the lithium pool,
containment, wall, and floor for the Base Case are shown in
Figure 3.6. The parameters studied are reported below in
order of decreasing importance.
3.4.3.a Increasing the Weight of Oxygen Available:
At low oxygen concentrations in the containment (2 w/o,
5 w/o), the fire is not self-sustaining. The lithium pool
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TABLE 3.8
Compilation of Sensitivity Study
RM No. Max. Li
Tep.(0 F)
Max. Gas
Temp.
(OF)
Max. Gas
Press.
(psig)
Max Wall Liner Max. Concrete
Temp. Tep.
(OF) (OF)
Max. CBRH End of
(lb/hr-fr2 ) Li Fire
(sec)
1
Base Case
3081 1849 43.5
2 2963
ASNA-100%
of total floor area
3
Spillte
= 1620 0
4
Spill Te
= 1260 0
5
6
Fc4B=. 50
7
0% burne
as spray
8
.5% burr
as spray
9
2% burne
as spray
10
3% burne
as spray
11
5% burne
as spray
12
%02=2%
13
%02=5%
2354 56.2
3057 1817 42.7
mp.
R
3044 1794 42.1
R
2851 1845 43.4
2389 1762 41.4
3083 1850 43.6
d
3082 1851 43.6
3080 1850 43.5
d
3078 1846 43.5
3076 1852 43.6
1329
1637
1298
1277
1292
1197
1330
1330
1329
1330
1331
1796 249 4.6 167
1796 406 8.6 282
432
404
420
413
431
430
432
432
432
432
433
123
191
7.36 2900
6.44 804
7.17 2923
7.06 3016
6.80 3103
5.64 3709
7.38 2805
7.37 2801
7.34 2801
7.33 2802
7.28 2706
.42 27001
1.08 -
... M..dwoft. -
d
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Table 3.8 con't.
Run no. Max. Li
Tw.(OF)
Max. Gas Max. Gas
Temp. Press.
(OF) (psig)
Max Wall Liner Max. Concrete
Tem. Temp.
(OF) (OF)
Max. QuR1 End of
(lb/hr-ft 2 ) Li fire
(sec)
14
%02-10%
15
16
ED0C=. 2
DEMNG.1
17
EKAC=.4
DUMAG.2
18
DEMC=.4
EMWG-. 4
20
100% Li 2O2
2 028 797 18.3
3888 1982 46.9
3391 1805 42.2
2666 1652 38.6
2410 1649 38.5
2275
21 3171
1.39% of
total spilled
22 3139
2.78% of
total spilled
23 2982
11.1% of
total spilled
24
EMNAB=.78
ENNAW-.78
25
EKVC=. 4
2194
1796
999 21.7
817 19.51
1334 32.4
564
1382
1377
1289
1222
709
472
854
1875 43.1 1399
920 20.1
983 23.0
542
574
327
425
431
436
435
389
167
258
698
1819
997
ENG=.4, EMB=.78, Em.78, FCMB=.50
26 3068 1825
exp. decaying spill rate
27 2312 1167
mass transfer eq. coef.=.07
43.2 1302 419
26.7 864 409
2.21 25018
8.67 2400
7.87 2600
6.62 3218
6.15 3602
2.76 13008
8.03 700
7.77 1300
6.74 18000
5.73 3506
5.27 5700
7.94 2600
2.96 7118
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zig. 3.6 Temperature History for a Lithium Fire
in the UWMAK-III Containment
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$00
1200 41
(2)
0 4 1.2 1.6 20
I ed
y
e Te.
Time (10- sec.)
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temperature drops off rapidly from its spill temperature.
The reaction rate is so slow that the pool reaches the
lithium melting temperature before all of the oxygen avail-
able is consumed. In a 10 w/o oxygen atmosphere, the fire
seems to be self-sustaining. The maximum lithium temperature
exceeds the spill temperature and drops to the melting point.
However, the later stages of the fire show signs of oxygen
depletion and a very slow reaction rate. At low oxygen
concentrations, the nitrogen reaction would be important
but no allowance is made for this in the current version of
SPOOL-FIRE. The lithium pool temperature listing is shown
in Figure 3.7 for various 02 concentrations.
3.4.3.b Increasing the Amount of Lithium Spilled:
For smaller spills, the lithium oxidizes very quickly
causing the containment to reach a maximum pressure that
increases with spill size. The Base Case nearly results in
producing the maximum containment pressure for all the cases
investigated. As expected, doubling the spill size doubled
the total energy released, although in the larger spill case
the release rate is slowed and greater energy transfer occurs
from the cell gas, thus preventing much higher cell gas tem-
peratures. Nearly all of the oxygen in the containment is
used up by the 11.1% Li spill and the fire shows signs of
oxygen depletion near its end. Still larger spills would be
limited by this lack of oxygen. The larger energy release
does, however, manifest itself by markedly increasing the
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Fiz. 3.7 Temperature History for a lithium Fire
in the UWMAK-III Containment
Run No. 12 02 Content= 2% by weizht
Run No. 14 02 Content= 101 by weight
(1) Li Pool Temp. Hun No. 12
(2) Cell Gas Temp. Run No. 12
(3) Li Pool Temo. Run No. 14(4) CeLL Gas Temp. Run No. 14
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
2'0
W~!~ (~~V se';,)
2400
£em.
2000
1 '00
1 200
T300 4
400 +
4
A
-
, e, ".)
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maximum concrete temperatures. The temperature history within
the containment as a function of lithium spill volume is shown
in Figure 3.8.
3.4.3.c Increasing the Pool Surface Area:
Although the reaction rate per unit area decreases slight-
ly with increasing pool surface area, the total reaction rate
increases greatly. For example, a surface area increase by a
factor of 4 results in a reaction rate increase by a factor of
3.5. For very hot lithium spills, it appears that dispersing
the lithium is not a feasible method of extinguishing the fire,
although indications are that lithium dispersal may be feasible
for lithium spills at lower temperatures. As can be seen from
Figure 3.9, the *value of FCMB (the fraction of heat transferred
to the lithium pool from combustion) is of major importance
in determining whether the lithium fire.will be self-sustaining
or not. FCMB is of course a function of pool surface area.
3.4.3.d Increasing the Radiative Exchange Factors
Between the Pool and the Containment Walls and
Gas (EMNAC and EMNAG):
Increasing these radiative exchange factors have the
same (although more pronounced) effect as decreasing FCMB.
The increased radiation from the pool lowers the pool tempera-
ture, hence lowering the reaction rate. The slower reaction
rate in turn lowers the maximum gas temperature and pressure.
Better estimates of FCMB, EMNAC, and EMNAG must be made before
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Fig. 3.8 remperature History for a Lithium Fire
in the UWMAK-III Containment
Run No. 21 1.4% of Li inventory spilLed
Run No. 23 11.1% of Li " "
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4
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'ig. 3.9 iemoerature Historv for a Lithium :ire in
the UWIVIAK-III Containment
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reliable predictions of lithium fire consequences can be
made using this model. A combustion zone model would be
very helpful in this regard. Also, better values for the
emissivities of liquid lithium and its combustion products
are needed. Figure 3.10 shows the effects of changing
EMNAC and EMNAG on the lithium pool and cell gas temperatures.
3.4.3.e Increasing the Radiative Exchange Factors
Between the Steel Liner and the Concrete
Surface (EMNAB and EMNAW) :
Increasing these exchange factors results in a decrease
of the maximum cell pressure obtained in lithium fires, as
shown in Figure 3.11. These two parameters obviously consti-
tute a major means of transferring heat out of the containment
and should be included in any further studies. Increasing
EMNAG and EMNAW also results in a very high concrete floor
temperature. Hence, further studies should also consider the
release of water from concrete structures as a result of such
high temperatures.
3.4.3.f Use of Smaller Convective Coefficient for
Mass Transfer Equation:
The use of 0.07 rather than 0.14 for the coefficient in
equation (3.7) more than halves the combustion rate. Pool
temperature and cell pressure are markedly decreased because
more time is available for heat transfer out of the cell. The
results are shown in Figure 3.12. There is an urgent need to
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Fig. 3.10 Temperature Historv for a Lithium
Fire in the UWMA -iII Containment
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Fi,. 3.11 Temoerature History for a Lithium Fire
in the UWMIAK-iIi Containment
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Fig. 3.12 Temperature History for a Lithium Fire
in the UWMAK-III Containment
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remodel the oxygen transfer mechanism to the lithium pool.
3.4.3.g Decreasing the Fraction of the Heat of
Combustion Going to the Pool (FCMB):
FCMB has a very significant effect on the maximum lithium
pool temperature as indicated earlier and as shown in Figure
3.9. The lithium pool temperature decreases strongly as FCMB
decreases. The decreased pool temperature also decreases the
reaction rate, although only slight decreases in the maximum
gas temperature and pressure result. The value of FCMB would
have greater effect in smaller spills, or in oxygen depleted
atmospheres. Again, a better combustion zone model is needed.
3.4.3.h Decreasing the Lithium Spill Temperature:
The initial lithium spill temperature has a negligible
effect on the maximum lithium temperature reached. Decreasing
the spill temperature does, however, decrease the reaction
rate and slightly decrease the maximum gas temperature and
pressure. For large spills with ample oxygen present, the
initial spill temperature is of little consequence-to the
final course of the accident. For smaller spills, or for
oxygen depleted atmospheres, the initial spill temperature
might determine whether or not the fire is self-sustaining.
3.4.3.i. Increasing the Percentage of Lithium Burned
as Spray:
-126-
Although increasing the percentage of lithium burned as
spray directly affects the initial gas temperature and pres-
sure, it has a negligible effect on the overall course of the
resulting pool fire.
3
.
4
.
3
.j Use of 100% Li 2 02 as Reaction Product:
Using Li2 02 as the reaction product from lithium combus-
tion, rather than Li 20, results in greater energy release.
However, the reaction rate resulting is slower because the
reaction requires twice as much oxygen as does the production
of Li 20. This effect in turn results in lower peak pool
and cell gas temperatures. At high temperatures the Li 2 0
reaction would normally dominate.
3.4.3.k Use of a Finite Spill Time
Use of an exponentially decaying spill rate had almost
no effect on the peak gas temperatures and pressures reached.
Because of the combustion model used, the combustion rate in
the lithium pool was independent of spill rate. Therefore,
the resultant temperature-pressure histories showed very
little change from the Base Case.
The results of the sensitivity study as outlined above
is summarized in Figure 3.13.
3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Studies
Lithium-oxygen reactions are capable of releasing large
amounts of energy into the containments of fusion reactors as
Figure 3.13 Change of the Maximum Lithium Pool Temperature Due to
Variation of SPOOL-FIRE Parameters
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currently designed. Containment overpressures as high as 40
psig may be expected from a lithium-air fire involving 5% of
the coolant in normal atmospheres. Removal of oxygen would
limit this overpressurization significantly, although the
current version of SPOOL-FIRE, used in this study, does not
take into account lithium-nitrogen reactions.
SPOOL-FIRE provides a simple model of liquid metal fires,
although a number of important modifications should be made:
1) the inclusion of a model for lithium-nitrogen
reaction;
2) the effects of humidity;
3) the release of water from heated concrete;
4) the release of energy and gases from lithium-concrete
reactions;
5) the inclusion of a "combustion zone" in pool fires;
6) diffusion as well as convection of oxygen ( and nitro-
gen) to the combustion zone;
7) radiant and convective heat transfer from the combus-
tion zone to the environs;
8) the inclusion of models for LiOH and Li 202 formation,
using second law thermodynamics and chemical equili-
brium effects.
Design strategies which could be studied for mitigating
the consequences of a lithium pool fire include:
1) emergency space cooling;
2) inert gas flooding of the containment;
-129-
3) containment ventilation;
4) the addition of chemicals for the extinguishment
of fires;
5) surface cooling of the lithium pool.
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APPENDIX I
Tritium Release Fault Trees
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